Limits and Security of Free-Space Quantum Communications by Pirandola, Stefano
This is a repository copy of Limits and Security of Free-Space Quantum Communications.




Pirandola, Stefano orcid.org/0000-0001-6165-5615 (2021) Limits and Security of Free-





This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) licence. This licence 
allows you to distribute, remix, tweak, and build upon the work, even commercially, as long as you credit the 
authors for the original work. More information and the full terms of the licence here: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
PHYSICAL REVIEW RESEARCH 3, 013279 (2021)
Limits and security of free-space quantum communications
Stefano Pirandola
Department of Computer Science, University of York, York YO10 5GH, United Kingdom
(Received 9 September 2020; accepted 5 March 2021; published 25 March 2021)
The study of free-space quantum communications requires tools from quantum information theory, optics,
and turbulence theory. Here we combine these tools to bound the ultimate rates for key and entanglement
distribution through a free-space link, where the propagation of quantum systems is generally affected by
diffraction, atmospheric extinction, turbulence, pointing errors, and background noise. Besides establishing
ultimate limits, we also show that the composable secret-key rate achievable by a suitable (pilot-guided and
postselected) coherent-state protocol is sufficiently close to these limits, therefore showing the suitability of
free-space channels for high-rate quantum key distribution. Our paper provides analytical tools for assessing the
composable finite-size security of coherent-state protocols in general conditions from the standard assumption
of a stable communication channel (as is typical in fiber-based connections) to the more challenging scenario of
a fading channel (as is typical in free-space links).
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevResearch.3.013279
I. INTRODUCTION
In a future vision where quantum technologies are expected
to be developed on a large scale, hybrid and flexible architec-
tures represent a key strategy for their success [1]. Quantum
communications will need to involve mixed scenarios where
fiber connections, good for fixed ground stations, are merged
and interfaced with free-space links, clearly more suitable
for mobile devices. Currently, fiber-based implementations
are well studied, but free-space quantum channels are clearly
underdeveloped from the point of view of theoretical analysis,
both in terms of ultimate limits and rigorous security assess-
ment. Indeed, they require a more demanding study due to
the presence of many effects, such as diffraction, atmospheric
extinction, turbulence effects, pointing errors, etc.
In this paper, we consider all these aspects by combining
tools from quantum information theory [2,3], optics [4–7],
and turbulence theory [8–11]. In this way, we investigate the
ultimate limits of free-space quantum communications, estab-
lishing upper and lower bounds on the maximum number of
secret key bits (and entanglement bits) that can be shared by
two remote parties. Such analysis explicitly accounts for the
fading nature of the free-space channels together with their
typical background noise. Our treatment is mainly developed
for the relevant regime of weak turbulence but we also discuss
how to extend the results to stronger fluctuations.
Besides investigating the ultimate limits achievable in free-
space quantum communications, we also analyze the practical
secret-key rates that are achievable in such conditions by
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continuous-variable (CV) protocols of quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD) [12]. To this aim, we develop a general theory for
assessing the composable finite-size security of coherent-state
protocols [13,14], starting from the standard assumption of a
stable communication channel (e.g., as typical in fiber-based
connections) to considering the more challenging scenario
of a free-space fading channel, whose transmissivity rapidly
fluctuates.
In particular, we have designed a coherent-state protocol,
aided by pilot pulses and a suitable postselection procedure,
which is able to achieve high secret-key rates in conditions
of weak turbulence, within one order of magnitude of the
ultimate bounds. In this way, we show that generally turbulent
free-space channels are indeed able to support high-rate QKD,
with immediate consequences for wireless quantum commu-
nications.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sec. II, we provide
the general bounds and capacities for free-space quantum
communications. In Sec. III, we provide a general formulation
of composable finite-size security for CV-QKD. In Sec. IV,
we extend this formulation to free-space, showing that suit-
ably high key rates can indeed be achieved. Finally, Sec. V is
for conclusions.
II. BOUNDS FOR FREE-SPACE QUANTUM
COMMUNICATIONS
A. Diffraction-limited bounds
Consider two remote parties separated by distance z, one
acting as a transmitter (Alice) and the other as a receiver
(Bob). They are located approximately at the same altitude
h on earth’s surface. We consider free-space quantum com-
munication mediated by a quasimonochromatic bosonic mode
(λ-nm large and t-sec long) represented by a Gaussian
beam, with carrier wavelength λ, curvature R0, and field spot
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size w0 [5,6,15,16]. The beam is prepared by the transmitter
(whose aperture is sufficiently larger than w0) and directed
toward the receiver, whose aperture is circular with radius aR.
Due to free-space diffraction, the receiver gets a beam whose
spot size is increased to
w
2
z = w20[(1 − z/R0)2 + (z/zR)2], (1)
where zR := πw20λ−1 defines the Rayleigh range. Because
the receiver only collects a portion aR of the spread beam,
there is a diffraction-induced transmissivity associated with
the channel, given by





See Appendix A for a brief review on the basic theory of free-
space propagation with Gaussian beams.
Let us apply the point-to-point repeaterless Pirandola-
Laurenza-Ottaviani-Banchi (PLOB) bound [17] (x) :=
− log2(1 − x) to ηd, which provides the secret key capacity
and the two-way entanglement distribution capacity of the
pure loss channel with transmissivity ηd. Then, we find that
the maximum rate K of secret key bits that can be distributed
per transmitted mode through the free-space channel must
satisfy







(See Appendix B for an explicit proof.) Let us stress that,
because entanglement bits (or ebits) are a specific type of
private bits, this inequality also provides an upper bound for
the maximum rate of ebits per mode E  K that is achievable
by protocols of entanglement distribution. The diffraction-
limited bound U (z) is simple, depending only on the ratio
between the receiver’s aperture aR and the spot size of the
beam at the receiver wz. Furthermore, it is not restricted to the
far field (z ≫ zR).
We can check that U (z) is maximized by a focused
beam (R0 = z), providing Ufoc(z) = 2 f0R/ ln 2, where f0R :=
[πw0aR/(λz)]
2 is the Fresnel number product of the beam
and the receiver. However, this solution is typically restricted
to short distances. A more robust solution, suitable for any
distance, is to employ a collimated beam (R0 = ∞). In such a











This formula is simple but may be too optimistic, not
including other important physical aspects of free-space com-
munication. We progressively include them below.
B. Atmospheric extinction and setup efficiency
Besides free-space geometric loss ηd due to diffraction,
there are other inevitable effects to consider which include
atmospheric extinction. In fact, while a Gaussian beam is
propagating through the atmosphere, it is subject to both
absorption and scattering. For a fixed altitude h above the
ground/sea level, the overall atmospheric transmissivity is
modeled by the Beer-Lambert extinction equation
ηatm(h, z) = exp[−α(h)z], (5)
where z is the path length in the atmosphere, and α(h) =
N (h)σ is the extinction factor [7, Chap. 11]. Here N (h) is
the mean number of particles per unit volume at altitude h,
and σ = σabs + σsca is the total cross section associated with
molecular and aerosol absorption (σabs) and scattering (σsca)
[11, Chap. 2]. In general, both Rayleigh and Mie scattering
give contributions to σsca.
Assuming a standard model of atmosphere, one can write
its mean density at altitude h as [18]
N (h) = N0 exp(−h/h̃), (6)
where h̃ = 6600 m and N0 = 2.55 × 1025 m−3 is the density
at sea level. As a result, we may similarly write
α(h) = α0 exp(−h/h̃), (7)
where α0 ≃ 5 × 10−6 m−1 is a good estimate of the extinction
factor at sea level for the optical wavelength λ = 800 nm (see
also Sec. III.C of Ref. [19]).
Besides extinction, there is also a fixed constant contribu-
tion associated with the local transmissivities of the setups.
At the receiver, we may have nonunit transmissivity ηeff as
a result of fiber couplings and limited quantum efficiency of
the detector. In a realistic implementation, one may reach
values of ηeff ≃ 0.5 [20,21]. At the transmitter, there may be
an additional loss ηT due to the diffraction caused by the
finite radius aT of its aperture. For the sake of simplicity, in
our treatment we assume that aT  2w0, so we can safely
set ηT ≃ 1 (see Appendix A 2). Small deviations from this
assumption can be considered by explicitly reinserting param-
eter ηT into the model. In our study, we generally assume the
worst-case scenario where ηeff may cause leaks to a poten-
tial eavesdropper (suitable relaxations of this assumption into
scenarios of trusted loss/noise for the receiver are discussed
afterward).
Atmospheric extinction and setup efficiency cause several
modifications to the general diffraction-limited bounds dis-
cussed in Sec. II A above. In fact, we need to consider the
combined transmissivity ηdηatmηeff, which leads to the revised
upper bound

















where the latter expansion is obtained in the far field, so we
can use ηd ≃ 2a2R/w2z ≪ 1 and the linear approximation of the
PLOB bound (x) ≃ x/ ln 2.
It is important to remark that the combined transmissivity
ηdηatmηeff still misses an important aspect: the process of
channel fading induced by atmospheric turbulence and point-
ing errors, a process that was pioneered in seminal works from
the late ’60s and early ’70s [22–24].
C. Turbulence and pointing errors
1. Broadening and wandering of the beam
Assuming weak turbulence, we can identify physical pro-
cesses with different timescales [25]. On a fast timescale, we
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have the broadening of the beam waist due to the interaction
with smaller turbulent eddies; for this reason, wz becomes a
larger short-term spot size wst. On a slow timescale, we have
the deflection of the beam due to the interaction with the larger
eddies. This causes the random Gaussian wandering of the
beam centroid with variance σ 2TB. Its dynamics is of the order
of 10 − 100 ms [26], which means that it can be resolved by
a sufficiently fast detector (e.g., with a realistic bandwidth of
100 MHz). Pointing errors from jitter and imprecise tracking
also cause centroid wandering with a slow timescale. For a
typical 1 μrad error at the transmitter, it contributes with a
variance σ 2P ≃ (10−6z)
2
, so the centroid wanders with total
variance σ 2 = σ 2TB + σ 2P . The characterization of wst and σ 2TB
needs specific tools from turbulence theory that we introduce
below.
For a beam with wave number k = 2π/λ and propagation







where C2n is the refraction index structure constant (measuring
the strength of the fluctuations in the refraction index caused
by spatial variations of temperature and pressure). Parameter
C2n is typically described by the Hufnagel-Valley (H-V) model
of atmospheric turbulence [27,28] (see Appendix C for de-
tails). For an horizontal path, the structure constant takes a
fixed value which depends on the specific altitude, besides the
time of day and weather conditions. In particular, its value
is typically larger during the day, meaning that the effects of
turbulence are more pronounced for daytime operation. For
slightly slant paths, it is a good approximation to average C2n
over the various altitudes or, alternatively, to take its highest
value along the path, typically at the lowest altitude. (In our
following numerical investigations, we assume a horizontal
path with h = 30 m.)
Then, the regime of weak turbulence can be expressed by
the condition
z  k[min{2aR, ρ0}]2 (12)
or, alternatively, it can be more stringently expressed in terms
of the Rytov parameter as
σ 2Rytov = 1.23C2n k7/6z11/6 < 1. (13)
For weak turbulence and setting φ := 0.33(ρ0/w0)1/3, we
may write the analytical approximations [29]:
w
2













These analytical expressions are rigorous for φ ≪ 1 and
represent very good approximations for ρ0/w0 < 1. For
ρ0/w0  1, they need to be replaced by numerical estimates
(see Appendix C for details). For ρ0/w0 ≫ 1, σ 2TB is negli-
gible and w2st is equal to the long-term spot size w
2
lt = w2z +
2[λz/(πρ0)]
2 [25]. Let us also note that, in the limit of negli-
gible turbulence C2n → 0, we have ρ0 → ∞. In such a case,
Yura’s analytical expansions are just replaced by σTB ≃ 0
and wlt ≃ wst ≃ wz (which all come from the collapse of the
FIG. 1. Free-space communication from a transmitter (Tx) to a
receiver (Rx) separated by distance z. The transmitter generates a
Gaussian beam with spot size w0 and mean number of photons n̄T .
The propagation of the beam is affected by diffraction, atmospheric
extinction ηatm, and turbulence/pointing errors, so its short-term
spot-size wst is randomly deflected by r from the aperture center of
the receiver, with an associated transmissivity ηst(r). The beam is
also affected by an additional attenuation, given by the efficiency ηeff
of the receiver. In total, transmitter and receiver are connected by an
instantaneous lossy channel with transmissivity τ (r) = ηst(r)ηatmηeff
as in Eq. (17). Besides loss, we also consider noise. In particular,
thermal noise n̄B is collected by the field of view of the Rx and
further noise n̄ex may be locally generated by setup imperfections. As
a result, the detector is hit by n̄R = τ (r)n̄T + n̄ mean photons whose
n̄ = ηeffn̄B + n̄ex are due to thermal noise.
long-term spot size w2lt = w2st + σ 2TB into its diffraction com-
ponent w2z ).
2. Incorporating short-term effects and deflection
The first mathematical modification induced by turbulence
is that the diffraction-limited transmissivity ηd needs to be
replaced by a more general expression ηst in terms of the
short-term waist wst, i.e.,










:= ηfarst , (15)
where the expansion is valid in the far field (z ≫ zR). The new
loss parameter
η := ηstηatmηeff (16)
represents the maximum value of the link transmissivity when
the beam centroid xC is perfectly aligned with the center xR of
the receiver’s aperture.
Because the beam centroid wanders following a Gaussian
probability with variance σ 2, the actual instantaneous value of
the transmissivity varies over time and can only be  η. This
leads to the second modification associated with the fading
process: The maximum transmissivity η needs to be replaced
by a distribution P0(τ ) of instantaneous transmissivities τ 
η. Here we first connect the instantaneous transmissivity τ to
the deflection value r := ‖xC − xR‖  0; we will then super-
impose the random walk in r to describe the fading process
affecting τ (discussed in the next subsection).
As also depicted in Fig. 1, for each value of the deflection
r, there is an associated transmissivity
τ (r) = ηst(r)ηatmηeff, (17)
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In the expression above, the factor Q0(x, y) is an incomplete
Weber integral [30],





where the notation In denotes a modified Bessel function of
the first kind with order n. Note that Eq. (18) is obtained by
adapting a previous result [31, Eq. (D2)].
Following Ref. [31], we have that ηst(r) can be well-
approximated by the analytical expression







where γ and r0 are shape and scale (positive) parameters,































with n(x) := exp (−2x)In(2x). As a result, combining
Eqs. (17) and (20), we may write







3. Incorporating beam wandering
Beam wandering is modeled by treating the position of
the centroid as a stochastic variable, which can be taken to
be Gaussian [32] with variance σ 2 around the center of the
receiver’s aperture, where σ 2 is the sum of two independent
contributions: the variance σ 2TB due to large-scale turbulence
and the variance σ 2P due to pointing error. In general, one
may also assume that the wandering is around an average
deflection point at a nonzero distance d from the center of
the receiver’s aperture. For the sake of simplicity, here we
consider the optimal working condition of d = 0, which can
always be realized by means of sufficiently fast adaptive
optics.
The Gaussian random walk around the receiver’s center
induces a Weibull distribution for the deflection r, expressed











In turn, the Weibull distribution over r induces a correspond-

























as also discussed in Appendix D.
The random fluctuation of the effective transmissivity τ
creates a fading channel from transmitter to receiver that can
be described by the ensemble E := {P0(τ ), Eτ }, where the
lossy channel Eτ with transmissivity τ is randomly selected
with probability density P0(τ ). Using the convexity properties
of the relative entropy of entanglement (REE) [33–35] over an
ensemble of channels as in Ref. [17, Eq. (17)], we can bound





dτ P0(τ )(τ ) := B(η, σ ), (26)
where (τ ) = − log2(1 − τ ) is the PLOB bound associated
with the instantaneous channel Eτ .
The integral in Eq. (26) can be simplified by working with
the variable ln(η/τ ) and then solving by parts. In this way, we
find that the maximum secret key rate achievable through the
free-space channel is bounded by
K  B(η, σ ) = −(η, σ ) log2(1 − η), (27)
where the correction factor  is given by











ex − η . (28)
The formula in Eq. (27) is our main result: It bounds the secret
key capacity K and the entanglement-distribution capacity
E of a free-space lossy channel E affected by diffraction,
extinction, setup loss, and fading, the latter being induced by
turbulence and pointing errors.
We can further simplify the upper bound B(η, σ ) for high
loss η ≪ 1. In fact, in such a case, we can reduce the 
correction and write the approximate bound:
B(η, σ ) ≃ η(η, σ )
ln 2
, (29)












Note that the condition η ≪ 1 is not necessarily achieved in
the far field, because η = ηstηatmηeff and the factors ηatmηeff
may decrease the overall value of the transmissivity already
in the near field. In the far field (z ≫ zR), we may use both
η ≪ 1 and the expansion ηst ≃ 2a2Rw−2st , so we can write






(η, σ ). (31)
In our model above, the free-space channel E is an ensem-
ble {P0(τ ), Eτ } of instantaneous pure-loss channels Eτ with
probability P0(τ ). For all these channels, the upper bound
(τ ) is achievable by their (bosonic) reverse coherent in-
formation [36,37], which corresponds to the optimal rate
of entanglement distribution protocols assisted by one-way
classical communication (see Appendix E for details). Aver-
aging over P0(τ ) implies that the upper bound in Eq. (27) is
achievable by these entanglement distribution protocols and,
therefore, we may write E = K = − log2(1 − η), where
E  K is the entanglement distribution capacity of the link.
In conclusion, as long as we can neglect thermal noise and
consider a pure-loss fading process, the bound in Eq. (27)
represents both the secret-key and entanglement distribution
capacity of the free-space link. In particular, note that the
formulas in Eqs. (27) and (29) have a clear structure. They are
given by the capacity − log2(1 − η) ≃ η/ ln 2 achievable with
a perfectly aligned link with no wandering, multiplied by a
free-space correction factor which accounts for the wandering
effects ( ≃ ).
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One can check that, with the assumptions of negligible
turbulence and pointing error (σ ≃ 0 and ηst ≃ ηd), we have
 ≃ 1 in Eq. (28), and Eq. (27) reduces to Eq. (8). If we
further assume no atmospheric extinction and unit setup ef-
ficiency, Eq. (27) reduces to Eq. (3) which only accounts for
free-space diffraction.
D. Thermal noise
The quantity − log2(1 − η) in Eq. (27) provides an upper
bound even in the presence of thermal noise. The reason is
because any instantaneous thermal-loss channel Eτ,n̄ adding a
mean number of photons n̄ can be written as a decomposition
of a pure-loss channel Eτ followed by a suitable additive-
Gaussian noise channel [3]. Because the PLOB bound  is
based on the REE, it is monotonic over such decompositions,
meaning that its value (τ, n̄) computed over Eτ,n̄ cannot
exceed its value (τ ) over Eτ . Thus, the loss-based upper
bound in Eq. (27) is still valid in the presence of thermal
noise (no matter if this noise is trusted or untrusted). However,
it is no longer guaranteed to be achievable. For this reason,
we derive a tighter upper bound and a corresponding lower
bound (technical details about the following derivations are in
Appendix F).
Assume that the receiver collects a nontrivial amount of
thermal noise which couples into the output mode. The natural
source is the brightness of the sky B
sky
λ which varies between
≃ 1.5 × 10−6 and ≃ 1.5 × 10−1 W m−2 nm−1 sr−1, from
clear night to cloudy daytime [38] (and assuming that the
field of view does not include the moon or the sun). For a
receiver with aperture aR, angular field of view fov, and using
a detector with time window t and spectral filter λ around







λ , ŴR := λtfova2R, (32)
where h is Planck’s constant and c is the speed of light.
As an example, for a 100 MHz detector (t = 10 ns) with
a filter λ = 1 nm around λ = 800 nm, and a telescope with
aR = 5 cm and fov = 10−10sr, the value of n̄B ranges be-
tween ≃ 4.75 × 10−8 photons/mode (at night) and ≃ 4.75 ×
10−3 photons/mode (during a cloudy day). A fraction ηeffn̄B
of these photons is detected by a receiver with limited effi-
ciency ηeff. See Fig. 1.
It is important to note that the number of photons in the
natural background n̄B may be higher than that expected from
Eq. (32) as a consequence of the presence of bright sources
of light within the field of view of the receiving telescope.
Our formalism accounts for such deviations, even though we
consider Eq. (32) in our numerical simulations. In general, all
the (detected) photons coming from the outside channel must
be ascribed to Eve in the worst-case scenario, even though
this is an overpessimistic assumption due to the line-of-sight
configuration in free-space communication. However, such an
assumption must be made because Eve might inject and hide
her photons in the background.
Besides the natural background, excess photons n̄ex may
be created by imperfections in the receiver setup (e.g., due
to electronic noise and other errors), so the receiver sees a
total of n̄ = ηeffn̄B + n̄ex thermal photons. Thus, assuming
that n̄T mean photons are generated at the transmitter and
τ is the overall instantaneous transmissivity of the channel,
the receiver’s detector gets n̄R = τ n̄T + n̄ mean photons (per
mode). See Fig. 1.
The free-space process in Fig. 1 can be described by an
overall thermal-loss channel Eτ,n̄ with instantaneous transmis-
sivity τ and output thermal noise n̄. This channel is equivalent
to a beam-splitter mixing the signal mode with an input
thermal mode with n̄e := n̄(1 − τ )−1 mean photons. In the
worst-case scenario, Eve controls all the input noise and col-
lects all the photons that are leaked from the other output
of the beam splitter (which means that she collects photons
leaking from both the channel and the receiver setup).
To account for the centroid wandering, we adopt the distri-
bution P0(τ ) for the transmissivity τ while keeping the output
thermal noise n̄ as a constant. The latter is in fact composed
of a fraction n̄B which is independent from the fading process,
while the other contribution n̄ex can always be assumed to be
optimized over such a process (see discussion in Appendix
F 1 for more details). For this reason, the free-space fading
channel can be represented by the ensemble E = {P0(τ ), Eτ,n̄}.
For a free-space fading channel E with maximum transmis-
sivity η and thermal noise n̄  η, we compute the following
tighter upper bound for the secret key capacity:
K  −(η, σ ) log2(1 − η) − T (n̄, η, σ ), (33)
where the thermal correction T is given by









1 − n̄ + h(n̄)
]
− (n̄, σ ) log2(1 − n̄), (34)
and we have used the entropic function
h(x) := (x + 1) log2(x + 1) − x log2 x. (35)
We also compute the following achievable rate (lower bound)
for entanglement distribution and, therefore, secret key
generation:






For negligible noise n̄, the bounds in Eqs. (33) and (36)
collapse to the bound in Eq. (27). By contrast, for strong noise
n̄ = η, the thermal correction in Eq. (34) becomes predomi-
nant and we get K  0 from Eq. (33). The threshold condition
n̄ = η implies the existence of a maximum security distance
zmax for free-space QKD in the presence of thermal noise. A
simple bound on this maximum distance is achieved imposing
n̄ = ηd, leading to
2 f0R(zmax)  − ln(1 − n̄) (37)
for the case of a collimated beam.
E. Analysis of the ultimate bounds
To study our bounds, we consider different possibilities
which depend on the treatment of loss and noise present in
the setup of the receiver. In the worst-case scenario assumed
so far, we explicitly account for the nonideal values of the
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(a) (b) (c)
FIG. 2. Performance of free-space quantum communications in terms of bits per channel use versus distance. (a) We consider the general
worst-case scenario with untrusted loss and noise at the receiver (ηeff = 0.5, n̄ex = 0.05). We plot the ultimate loss-based upper bound of
Eq. (27) for nighttime (top red line) and daytime (red dashed line). This is compared with the bounds explicitly accounting for thermal noise
n̄ = ηeff n̄B + n̄ex. In particular, we plot the thermal upper bound of Eq. (33) for nighttime (black solid line) and daytime (black dashed line), as
well as the thermal lower bound of Eq. (36) for nighttime (blue solid line) and daytime (blue dashed line). (b) Same comparison as in (a) but
considering a noiseless receiver (ηeff = 0.5, n̄ex = 0). For nighttime, the upper and lower thermal bounds coincide with loss-based upper bound
(solid red line). For daytime, the performances are instead separate (dashed lines). (c) Same comparison as in (a) but considering an ideal
lossless and noiseless receiver (ηeff = 1, n̄ex = 0). As in (b), the two thermal bounds collapse in the loss-based upper bound during night
time (solid red line). Performances are different during daytime (dashed lines). Other parameters are R0 = ∞ (collimated Gaussian beam),
λ = 800 nm, w0 = aR = 5 cm, fov = 10−10 sr, t = 10 ns, and λ = 1 nm. We consider h = 30 m, so C2n ≃ 1.28(2.06) × 10−14 m−2/3 for
night (day), and we have n̄B ≃ 4.75 × 10−8 (×10−3) at night (cloudy day).
receiver parameters ηeff and n̄ex, assuming that Eve may access
that leakage and control that noise. This setting can be used to
bound the performance of all protocols where both leakage
and local noise in the receiving setup are considered to be
untrusted. We may then consider the case where the local
noise n̄ex is set to zero, i.e., a noiseless receiver. This setting
can be used to bound all protocols where such local noise is
considered to be trusted (trusted-noise scenario). Finally, we
may also consider the optimal case of n̄ex = 0 and ηeff = 1,
i.e., an ideal lossless and noiseless receiver. This can be used
to bound all those protocols where local noise and limited
efficiency of the receiver are both considered to be trusted
(trusted-loss-and-noise scenario).
Numerical behavior of the bounds is shown in Fig. 2.
For the chosen parameters, the condition of weak turbulence
σ 2Rytov < 1 limits day-time distance to a range of z  1km.
As we can see from Fig. 2(a), there is a clear gap between
the ultimate loss-based upper bound of Eq. (27) and the two
thermal bounds in Eqs. (33) and (36). This is created by
the presence of thermal noise n̄. During the night, when the
background contribution n̄B is negligible, it is the presence of
untrusted setup noise n̄ex to create the gap in the performances
[see solid lines in Fig. 2(a)]. During the day, there is a higher
turbulence on the ground as quantified by the higher value
of the structure constant C2n ; mainly for this reason, we have
a degradation of all the day-time rates with respect to their
nighttime counterparts [compare dashed with solid lines in
Fig. 2(a)]. For the thermal bounds, this degradation is slightly
increased due to the additional contribution of the thermal
background n̄B, which is non-negligible during the day.
In the case of a noiseless receiver as in Fig. 2(b), thermal
noise is only coming from the external background n̄B. For
nighttime operation, this background is negligible and the
two thermal bounds in Eqs. (33) and (36) collapse into the
loss bound of Eq. (27), which therefore represents the secret
key capacity (and entanglement distribution capacity) of the
nighttime link [see red solid line in Fig. 2(b)]. However,
during the day, the external background n̄B is not negligible
and this creates a small gap in the performance, so there is no
collapse of the thermal bounds [black and blue dashed lines
in Fig. 2(b)] into the upper loss-based bound [red dashed line
in Fig. 2(b)]. In the case of an ideal (lossless and noiseless)
receiver, we have basically the same situation but with higher
rates, as shown in Fig. 2(c).
An interesting observation for daytime operation is the
trade-off between Eq. (15), where aR increases the trans-
missivity, and Eq. (32), where aR increases thermal noise.
For this reason, the optimal performance is achieved when
the receiver’s aperture aR takes an intermediate value. For
instance, consider the case of an ideal receiver and let us study
the behavior of the two thermal bounds in Eqs. (33) and (36)
as a function of aR at some fixed distance, say z = 1 km. As
we can see from Fig. 3, we find an optimal working point at
around aR ≃ 10 cm for the specific regime considered. This is
true as long as the other parameters of the receiver are fixed,
such as its field of view fov which intervenes in Eq. (32).
Note that the field of view does not directly depend on aR, but
FIG. 3. For daytime and fixed distance z = 1 km, we plot the
thermal bounds in Eqs. (33) and (36) as a function of the receiver’s
aperture aR. We assume an ideal receiver (n̄ex = 0 and ηeff = 1).
Other parameters are as in Fig. 2.
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decreases with the focal length of the receiver’s telescope f
and increases with the area of the detector a. For instance, for a
rectilinear optical system focused at ∞, it is easy to check that
the angle of view satisfies 
1/2
fov ≃ 2 arctan(
√
a/2 f ), which is
also a good approximation for a spherical optical system.
1. Noise filtering
It is important to note that the behavior of the thermal
bounds is strongly dependent on the filter λ. So far, nu-
merical investigations have assumed a value of λ = 1 nm,
which is the value of the narrow-band filter typically consid-
ered in studies with discrete variables. At 800 nm, the value
λ = 1 nm corresponds to a relatively large bandwidth of
ν = cλ−2λ ≃ 470 GHz. However, in the setting of CVs,
much narrower filters are possible by exploiting suitable in-
terferometric procedures at the receiver, so the effective value
of ν becomes equivalent to the bandwidth of the transmitted
pulses.
An important ingredients in experiments with CV systems
is the local oscillator (LO). They are typically performed
with a transmitted LO (TLO), where each quantum signal is
multiplexed in polarization with an associated LO and both
are sent to the receiver. At the receiver, signal and LO are
demultiplexed via a polarizing beam splitter and made in-
terfered on a beam splitter before detection (in a homodyne
or heterodyne setup). Alternatively, CV experiments may be
performed with a local local oscillator (LLO), where quantum
signals are interleaved with strong reference pulses, the latter
being used by the receiver to reconstruct the LO locally (with
some imperfection [39,40]).
It is important to note that, in a homodyne measurement,
the output of the detector is proportional to
√
n̄LOx̂, where x̂
is the generic quadrature of the signal and n̄LO is the num-
ber of photons from the LO. The value of n̄LO can be very
high. In fact, considering 10-ns-long pulses from a 100-mW
laser at λ = 800 nm, we have that each pulse contains n̄LO ≃
4 × 109 photons. Even if we pessimistically assume 20 dB of
loss (τ ≃ 10−2), we see that about O(107) photons reach the
receiver.
Thanks to the large prefactor
√
n̄LO, only the contribution
of thermal noise mode-matching with the LO will survive
in the output. This means that the interferometric process
introduces an effective filter which is given by the bandwidth
ν of the LO. Compatibly with the time-bandwidth product
tν  0.44 (for Gaussian pulses), one can make ν very
small. As an example, for a 10-ns pulse, we may consider
ν = 50 MHz corresponding to just λ = 0.1 pm around
800 nm; this filter is four orders of magnitude narrower than
the one considered above. With respect to λ = 1 nm, such
a narrow filter realizes a corresponding 10−4 suppression of
the background noise n̄B, which therefore becomes negligible
(daytime noise becomes n̄B ≃ 10−7). As a result, the detector
would only experience locally generated noise, i.e., n̄ ≃ n̄ex.
From the point of view of the rates, with a narrow filter
λ = 0.1pm, we have an increase of the daytime thermal
bounds in Fig. 2. In particular, for a noiseless setup (n̄ex = 0)
we have n̄ ≃ 0. In this case, the daytime thermal bounds
computed from Eqs. (33) and (36) collapse into the daytime
loss bound given by Eq. (27), which therefore becomes the
secret-key capacity (and entanglement distribution capacity)
of the daytime link. This means that the black and blue dashed
lines in Fig. 2(b) collapse into the upper red dashed line.
The same happens in Fig. 2(c) which refers to a lossless and
noiseless setup, but with higher rates.
It is worth stressing that, if we optimize over the receiver
to make the total thermal noise n̄ negligible (as a result of
a noiseless setup n̄ex ≃ 0 and noise filtering n̄B ≃ 0), then
the loss bound of Eq. (27) is achievable no matter what the
external conditions are (nighttime or daytime). It is also clear
that this bound can be further optimized by assuming no
pointing error at the transmitter and unit quantum efficiency at
the receiver. The result of these optimizations (implicit in our
formula) provides a bound/capacity which uniquely depends
on the external free-space channel between the two remote
parties (affected by diffraction, extinction, and turbulence).
F. Extension of the bounds
1. Slow detection
So far, we have considered the situation where the detector
of the receiver is fast enough to resolve the wandering of
the centroid. In general, this dynamics has two components:
on the one hand, there are the fluctuations induced by atmo-
spheric turbulence, with a timescale of the order of 10–100
ms; on the other hand, there is pointing error (from jitter
and imprecise tracking) that fluctuates over a slightly slower
timescale, of the order of 0.1−1 s. For detection, we can
therefore identify three different regimes: (i) fast detectors
able to resolve all the dynamics above; (ii) intermediate de-
tectors, able to solve part of the dynamics, i.e., pointing-error
wandering but not turbulence-induced fluctuations; and (iii)
slow detectors, not able to resolve any of the wandering dy-
namics. For instance, the latter situation may occur when the
measurement time is intentionally increased with the aim of
increasing the detection efficiency. In all cases, we assume
that the pulses have a temporal length perfectly matching the
bandwidth of the detector.
In the case of an intermediate detector (ii), we integrate
over the fast fading process induced by turbulence. As a result,
we have an overall fading channel which is only generated by
the pointing error, and whose instantaneous transmissivity is
now determined by the long-term spot size w2lt = w2st + σ 2TB.
Let us set
ηint = ηltηatmηeff, (38)










:= ηfarlt . (39)
Then we may write the upper bound
Kint  Bint := −(ηint, σP) log2(1 − ηint), (40)
where  of Eq. (28) has to be computed over ηint and σP
(with parameters r0 and γ to be computed over ηlt and η
far
lt ).
Similarly, the thermal upper bound takes the form
Kint  Bint − T (n̄, ηint, σP). (41)
Basically, we obtain the modified formulas by setting σ 2TB ≃
0 and replacing wst with the long-term spot size wlt in the
bounds of Eqs. (27), (33), and (36).
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Assuming a slower detector (iii), we need to integrate over
the entire fading process induced by turbulence and pointing
error. Instead of a fading channel, we now have an average
lossy channel with transmissivity ηtot which is determined
by the long-term spot size w2lt = w2st + σ 2TB together with the
variance of the pointing error σ 2P , besides ηatm and ηeff. In other










tot := w2lt + σ 2P = w2st + σ 2TB + σ 2P . (43)
As a result, the upper bound in Eq. (27) simplifies to






lt + σ 2P
. (44)
Similarly, the thermal upper bound of Eq. (33) becomes







n∗ := n̄/(1 − ηtot), (46)
for n̄  ηtot, and is equal to zero otherwise. Note that this
formula is a direct modification of Ref. [17, Eq. (23)].
It is important to note that, to fairly compare Eqs. (40),
(41), (44), and (45) with the previous fast-detection bounds,
we need to account for the clock of the system. In fact, in
such a comparison, one should explicitly account for the inte-
gration time which smooths the fluctuations but also reduces
the final rate (or throughput) in terms of bits per second. In
fact, given a rate K in terms of bits/use, we need to plug a
clock C (uses/second) which depends on the bandwidth of
the detector and the repetition rate of the source. The effective
rate (bits/second) would then be CK . For instance, using a
detector with bandwidth W = 100 MHz, we may work with
10-ns pulses and use a clock of C = W/3 ≃ 3.3 × 107 uses
(pulses) per second. If we assume a slow detector (and cor-
responding longer pulses) with a detection time of 100 ms,
we then have a clock of about 3.3 uses per second, leading
to an orders-of-magnitude lower rate in terms of bits per
second. Furthermore, long detection times also lead to higher
background noise, which may become a major problem for
daytime.
2. Intermediate and strong turbulence
The previous bounds for slow detection can be stated for
increasing levels of turbulence. From a physical point of
view, stronger values of turbulence can be associated with
an increasingly-faster averaging process so that the receiver
loses the ability to resolve the fading dynamics. The effect is
similar to having an increasingly slower detector. However,
besides this averaging process, there is also the appearance
of scintillation effects and other effects of beam deformation,
so the transition from weak to stronger regimes of turbulence
cannot be described in simple mathematical terms. That being
said, the concept of long-term spot size is robust and applies
to the various regimes of turbulence, from weak to strong [25,
Sec. III A]. In fact, even when the beam is broken up in multi-
ple patches, the long-term spot size provides the mean-square
radius of the region containing the patches.
In virtue of these considerations, we may rely on the ro-
bustness of the notion of long-term spot size to extend our
upper bounds beyond the weak (σ 2Rytov < 1) and the weak-
intermediate (σ 2Rytov ≃ 1) regimes of turbulence (see also
Appendix C for a discussion of these regimes in terms of the
ratio ρ0/w0). At intermediate-strong turbulence (σ
2
Rytov > 1),
the variance σ 2TB becomes relatively small, while the short-
term spot size wst tends to approximate the long-term value
wlt. If the pointing error is non-negligible, then we may
write the upper bounds in Eqs. (40) and (41). However, if
pointing error σ 2P is also negligible (with respect to w
2
lt),
then we directly consider the upper bounds in Eqs. (44) and
(45). For high values of turbulence (σ 2Rytov ≫ 1), we may
certainly assume σ 2P ≃ σ 2TB ≪ w2lt, and write the upper bounds
in Eqs. (44) and (45) for the strong-turbulence secret-key
capacity Kstrong. Because these bounds do not come from an
operational reduction of the detection time, the value C of the
system of clock can be high here.
III. COMPOSABLE SECURITY AND KEY RATES
FOR CV-QKD
In this part of the paper, we study practical rates for free-
space CV-QKD, therefore providing state-of-the-art lower
bounds for the free-space secret key capacities discussed in
Sec. II. In this specific section, we first develop a general and
simplified theory of composable security that applies to CV-
QKD protocols with a stable channel (fixed transmissivity),
as is the typical case in fiber-based implementations or even
certain free-space links where turbulence and other fading
effects are negligible. This theory is the basis for the next
section, Sec. IV, where we extend it to the case of CV-QKD
protocols over a fading channel (variable transmissivity) as is
the general case of free-space links affected by pointing errors
and turbulence. The latter is a more difficult scenario but with
interesting implications for both ground- and satellite-based
communications [42–49] .
A. Description of the protocol
Let us study a Gaussian-modulated coherent-state protocol
with a fixed transmissivity between Alice (the transmitter) and
Bob (the receiver) [12]. The general scenario is the one de-
picted Fig. 4. Alice encodes classical information in a bosonic
mode by preparing a coherent state |α〉 whose amplitude α
is modulated according to a complex Gaussian distribution
with zero mean and variance μ − 1. Note that we may write
α = (q + ip)/2, where x = q or p is the mean value of the
generic quadrature operator x̂ = q̂ or p̂ with [q̂, p̂] = 2i [3].
Therefore, the generic quadrature of the mode can be decom-
posed as x̂ = x̂0 + x, where x̂0 corresponds to vacuum noise
and the displacement x is a real Gaussian variable with zero
mean and variance σ 2x = μ − 1.
The coherent state contains n̄T = |α|2 mean number of
photons and it is transmitted through a channel with transmis-
sivity ηch and environmental noise n̄b = n̄B(1 − ηch)−1, so that
n̄B thermal photons are injected in the channel. (In terms of the
free-space configuration of Fig. 1, parameter ηch corresponds
to the instantaneous value ηatmηst(r), and n̄B is the thermal
background.) The output state is then measured by a receiver
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FIG. 4. General description of the protocol and worst-case eaves-
dropping scenario. Alice’s modulated coherent state |α〉, with n̄T
mean photons, is subject to channel loss ηch and background noise
n̄B, before entering the receiver with quantum efficiency ηeff and
setup noise n̄ex. Bob’s detects n̄R = τ n̄T + n̄ mean photons, where
τ = ηchηeff is the total transmissivity of the link and n̄ = ηeffn̄B + n̄ex
is the total number of thermal photons. The input-output relation
for the quadratures is given by Eq. (48). In the worst-case scenario,
Eve collects all the leakage and controls all thermal noise. This
is equivalent to assume that she replaces the channel with a beam
splitter with transmissivity τ and thermal input n̄e = n̄/(1 − τ ). The
latter is part of a TMSV state in her hands, whose output is stored in
a quantum memory.
with limited efficiency ηeff and affected by thermal noise, such
to add n̄ex extra mean photons. As a result, the final (ideal)
detection is reached by n̄R = τ n̄T + n̄ mean photons, where
τ = ηchηeff is the total transmissivity and
n̄ = ηeffn̄B + n̄ex (47)
is the total number of thermal photons. See Fig. 4.
The final detection is either a randomly switched measure-
ment of q̂ or p̂ (homodyne) or a joint measurement of q̂ and p̂
(heterodyne). In both cases, there is an outcome y correspond-
ing to Alice’s classical input x. A single pair (x, y) per mode is
generated by the homodyne protocol [14], while two pairs per
mode are generated by the heterodyne protocol [13]. For both
protocols, we may compactly write the input-output relation
y = √τx + z, (48)
where the noise variable is given by
z =
√




1 − ηeffx̂v + ξex + ξdet.
(49)
Here x̂b is the quadrature of the background thermal mode, x̂v
is the quadrature of a setup vacuum mode, ξex is a Gaussian
variable with variance 2n̄ex, and ξdet is an additional variable
whose variance depends on the specific type of final detection,
i.e., we have var(ξdet) = 0 for homodyne, and var(ξdet) = 1
for heterodyne. It is useful to introduce the quantum duty, νdet
to pay by the detector, which is νdet = 1 for homodyne (due
to the vacuum noise in the state) and νdet = 2 for heterodyne
(which is increased due to the simultaneous measurements
of the two conjugate quadratures). Thus, in total, the noise
variable z has variance
σ 2z = 2n̄ + νdet. (50)
Alice and Bob’s mutual information I (x : y) is the same
in direct reconciliation (Bob inferring x from y) and reverse
reconciliation (Alice inferring y from x). This is easy to com-
pute under ideal postprocessing techniques able to reach the
Shannon capacity of the additive-noise Gaussian channel. In
fact, from var(y) = τσ 2x + σ 2z and var(y|x) = σ 2z , one derives










where χ := σ 2z /τ is the equivalent noise, given by
χ = 2n̄B
ηch
+ νdet + 2n̄ex
τ
. (52)
In particular, note that the first term in Eq. (52) is the specific




= 2(n̄ − n̄ex)
τ
. (53)
For the homodyne and heterodyne protocols, we may explic-
itly write


















Before proceeding with the security analysis and the
derivation of the asymptotic key rate, it is important to clar-
ify the most relevant noise contributions that are present in
the setup noise n̄ex. In our paper, we assume the worst-case
scenario where this noise is considered to be untrusted, even
though it may be estimated or calibrated by the parties. This
robust approach allows us to lower bound the performances
that are achievable by CV-QKD in general, including those
situations where some of the setup noise is considered to
be trusted (as might be the case for some tolerable level of
electronic noise).
B. Practical observations on the receiver setup
Here we discuss the contributions to the setup noise, that
may be broken up as n̄ex = n̄LO + n̄el + n̄other, where n̄LO are
thermal photons generated by imperfection in the LO (phase
errors), n̄el is electronic noise, and n̄other is any other uncharac-
terized and independent noise source that might appear in the
setup (that we numerically neglect here). In general, the setup
noise n̄ex will depend on the channel transmissivity. Below we
start by describing n̄LO which has a different behavior depend-
ing on the type of LO. Afterward, we discuss the expression
of n̄el.
1. Local oscillator (TLO and LLO)
To encode and decode information with the quadratures of
a bosonic mode, the reference frames of the transmitter and
receiver need to be phase locked. There are two possible ways
to achieve this: either via a TLO or an LLO. In the experimen-
tal practice, the use of a TLO is the simplest solution. One the
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one hand, it introduces negligible phase error n̄TLO ≃ 0 and
guarantees that the spatial modes of the signal and LO pulses
are the same, so the mode matching is ideal at the receiver. On
the other hand, the fact that the LO transmitted together with
the signal means that it may also be the subject of attacks. This
problem can be mitigated by real-time monitoring of the LO
intensity and properties, so as to match the values expected by
the parties [12].
The other solution of a LLO excludes channel attacks
against the LO but inevitably introduces nontrivial phase
errors in the receiver setup. These phase errors provide a
contribution to the excess noise equal to
εLLO ≃ 2πσ 2x C−1lW, (56)
where C is the clock and lW is the laser linewidth. This for-
mula is derived from Ref. [39] assuming that signal pulses and
LO reference pulses are generated with the same coherence
time τcoh ≃ (π lW)−1. More generally, in Eq. (56) one needs to
consider the average linewidth (l
signal
W + lLOW )/2, but we omit
this technicality here.
From the formula, it is clear that the noise decreases for
higher clocks and narrower linewidths. In general, this ap-
proach requires better hardware than the TLO. In our analysis,
we have σ 2x  10, so a reasonably low value εLLO  0.02 can
be reached by C = 5 MHz and lW ≃ 1.6 KHz or, alternatively,
by C = 100 MHz and lW ≃ 32 KHz (e.g., together with a
1 GHz homodyne receiver for detecting 0.1C−1 ≃ 1 ns pulses
[50]). In other words, very good cw-lasers and detectors are
needed. Refined analyses suggest that highly performant am-
plitude modulators are also required to avoid the introduction
of other noise contributions [40,51].
To account for the LLO in our theoretical treatment, we
recall that Alice and Bob’s mutual information takes the form
in Eq. (51) where the equivalent noise χ is broken down as in
Eq. (52), i.e., we write




where εch := 2n̄B/ηch is channel’s excess noise. The intro-
duction of the LLO contribution consists of making the
replacement χ → χ + εLLO in the formula above. Because
this type of noise is within the local setup of the receiver, we




= πτσ 2x C−1lW. (58)
Some observations are in order. The basic implementa-
tion of LLO considers the regular alternation between signal
pulses and LO reference pulses. In such a setting, one may ar-
gue that the actual rate per second (throughput) is halved with
respect to the TLO. However, it is worth noting that this factor
1/2 may be compensated if the signals are encoded in both
polarizations for each channel use (not possible for a TLO
due to its multiplexing in polarization). Another observation is
about the use of homodyne or heterodyne at the receiver. Be-
cause of the regular signal-reference alternation, the receiver
may use a dedicated heterodyne detector for the LO references
and another detector for the signals (heterodyne or randomly
switched homodyne). However, if the receiver is limited to a
single homodyne detector, then the transmitter can send two
LO reference pulses with orthogonal polarizations and rotated
by π/2 in phase space. At the receiver, these pulses can be
demultiplexed, delayed, and sequentially homodyned to give
the complete phase information.
2. Electronic noise
One of the typical and unavoidable sources of noise within
the setup of the receiver is electronic noise, with associated
variance νel or equivalent number of photons n̄el = νel/2. This
depends on the noise equivalent power (NEP) of the ampli-
fiers and photodiodes to be used in the homodyne detectors,
besides the detection bandwidth W , the duration of the LO
pulses tLO, the LO power at the detector P
det
LO , and the fre-






At W = 100 MHz, we may consider NEP = 6 pW/
√
Hz.
Then, assuming ν ≃ 3.75 × 1014 Hz (λ = 800 nm) and
tLO = 10ns, we may write νel = 1.45 × 10−4νdet/PdetLO . In a
TLO setup, we have PdetLO = τPLO, where PLO is the initial LO





where the bound is taken by assuming the worst-case sce-
nario of heterodyne detection (νdet = 2). As we can see from
Eq. (60), the noise is small at short ranges but may become
non-trivial at long distances, e.g., νel  0.29 at 20 dB, i.e., for
τ = 10−2.
In the case of an LLO setup, where the LO pulse is locally
generated, we have PdetLO = PLO in Eq. (59). This means that νel
becomes independent from the transmissivity and its value can
be very low. In our numerical example, Eq. (60) is replaced by
νel  2.9 × 10−3. Thus, the LLO setup provides an advantage
with respect to the TLO in terms of reduced electronic noise
(to be balanced with the negative effect of introducing phase
errors).
3. Setup noise versus channel transmissivity
As we see from the discussion above, the setup noise n̄ex
also depends on the transmissivity of the channel τ , due to the
fact that the value of τ is relevant for both the LO power and
the (attenuated) modulation of the signals at the receiver. Let






Then, the setup noise n̄ex has different monotonicity in τ
depending on the use of a TLO or an LLO. In fact, we can
write the following:
n̄TLOex (τ ) =
el
τ
, n̄LLOex (τ ) = el + πτσ 2x C−1lW, (62)
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C. Asymptotic key rate
Once we have clarified the various contributions to ther-
mal noise, we proceed with the security analysis assuming
that the various imperfections of the receiver are untrusted,
both in terms of setup noise n̄ex and quantum efficiency ηeff.
Thus, our approach assumes the worst-case scenario where
Eve not only perturbs the outside channel (with transmissivity
ηch and background noise n̄B), but also collects the fraction
1 − ηeff of photons leaked by the receiver, and potentially
tampers with its setup noise n̄ex (which might be exploited
to insert Trojan-horse photons). As already said before, this is
a conservative approach which allows us to lower bound the
performance of CV-QKD and to remove the exploitation of
potential loopholes in the practical devices.
In the worst-case scenario, Alice and Bob ascribe the en-
tirety of loss τ = ηchηeff and thermal noise n̄ = ηeffn̄B + n̄ex
to Eve. See Fig. 4. In other words, Eve is assumed to have the
total control of the environmental dilation of the thermal-loss
channel Eτ,n̄ that is observed by the parties and leading to the
input-output relation of Eq. (48). Such a dilation corresponds
to a beam splitter of transmissivity τ that mixes each signal
mode with an environmental mode carrying n̄e = n̄/(1 − τ )
thermal photons, which is in turn part of a two-mode squeezed
vacuum (TMSV) state prepared by Eve. For each incoming
signal, a fresh TMSV state is prepared and used in the inter-
action. After interaction, the signal output of the beam splitter
is released to Bob, while the environmental output is stored in
a quantum memory, to be jointly measured by Eve at the end
of the protocol. This is a collective entangling-cloner attack
which is the most practical and relevant collective Gaussian
attack [54].
In this scenario, let us compute Eve’s Holevo informa-
tion, i.e., the maximum amount of information that she can
steal per use of the channel. It is convenient to work in the
entanglement-based representation, where Alice’s Gaussian-
modulated coherent states with variance σ 2x = μ − 1 are
realized by heterodyning the idler mode A of a TMSV state






μ2 − 1Z μI
)
, (63)
where I := diag(1, 1) and Z := diag(1,−1). After the action
of the thermal-loss channel on the transmitted mode A′, we










τ (μ2 − 1)Z,
b := τ (μ − 1) + 2n̄ + 1. (64)
Because the total output state ρABE of Alice A, Bob B and
Eve E = EE ′ is a pure state, we can compute Eve’s Holevo
bound from Alice’s and Bob’s von Neumann entropies S(· · · ).
In reverse reconciliation, Eve’s Holevo bound with respect to
Bob’s variable y is given by
χ (E : y) := S(E) − S(E|y) = S(AB) − S(A|y), (65)
where S(E) = S(AB) comes from the total purity, and
S(E|y) = S(A|y) comes from the fact that Bob’s measurement
is a rank-1 projection (homodyne/heterodyne), so that Alice
and Eve’s conditional state ρAE|y is pure.
It is easy to compute the entropies above starting from
Alice and Bob’s output CM VAB. Let us call ν± the two
symplectic eigenvalues of VAB. Then, we may write
S(AB) = H (ν+) + H (ν−), H (x) := h[(x − 1)/2], (66)
where H (x) is defined using Eq. (35). The value of S(A|y) is
given by computing H (x) over the symplectic eigenvalue of
the conditional CM VA|y, whose explicit expression depends
on the type of detection.
Let us set  := diag(1, 0). For the homodyne protocol,
Alice’s CM conditioned on Bob’s outcome y is [3,55,56]
VhomA|y = μI − b−1CCT , (67)









For the heterodyne protocol, we have instead [3,55,56]
VhetA|y = μI − (b + 1)−1CCT = νhetI, (69)
with symplectic eigenvalue
νhet = μ − τ (μ
2 − 1)
b + 1 . (70)
As a result, we have
χhom(E : y) = S(AB) − H (νhom), (71)
χhet(E : y) = S(AB) − H (νhet). (72)
For a realistic reconciliation efficiency β ∈ [0, 1], account-
ing for the fact that data processing may not reach the Shannon
limit, we write the asymptotic key rate
Rasy(τ, n̄) = βI (x : y)τ,n̄ − χ (E : y)τ,n̄ , (73)
where the explicit expressions for the homodyne protocol [14]
(Rhomasy ) and the heterodyne protocol [13] (R
het
asy) derive from
the corresponding expressions for the mutual information Ihom
and Ihet [cf. Eqs. (54) and (55)] and the Holevo bound χhom
and χhet [cf. Eqs. (71) and (72)]. In an experimental im-
plementation, the term βI in Eq. (73) is determined by the
empirical entropy associated with the key and the specific
code used for error correction.
It is important to observe that the rate in Eq. (73) can be
computed by Alice and Bob once they know the values of
the total transmissivity τ and the total thermal noise n̄. In a
practical setting, the values of τ and n̄ are not known but must
be evaluated during the protocol via a dedicated procedure
of parameter estimation. Because a realistic protocol runs for
a finite number of times, this estimation is not perfect and
decreases the rate.
Up to an error probability εpe, Alice and Bob derive
worst-case estimators τ ′ ≃ τ − f (τ, n̄) and n̄′ ≃ n̄ + g(n̄), for
suitable monotonic functions f and g (both increasing in n̄).
Thus, they use τ ′ and n̄′ to compute the parameter-estimation-
based version of the rate
Rpe(τ
′, n̄′) = βI (x : y)τ ′,n̄′ − χ (E : y)τ ′,n̄′ . (74)
Below we clarify the explicit expressions for f and g.
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D. Details of parameter estimation
Here we go into the fine details of parameter estimation,
also clarifying the explicit forms of the functions f and g that
are used above. For implementing this step of the protocol,
Alice and Bob jointly choose a random subset of m channel
uses. By publicly comparing the corresponding input-output
values, they estimate the relevant channel parameters (τ and n̄)
whose knowledge is crucial for applying the most appropriate
procedures of error correction and privacy amplification.
1. Estimators
Alice and Bob randomly choose m signals whose encoding
x and decoding y are publicly disclosed. This means that the
parties compare mp := νdetm pairs of values {xi, yi}mpi=1 related
by Eq. (48). These pairs are m for the homodyne protocol
and 2m for the heterodyne protocol. Under the assumption
of a collective Gaussian attack, they are Gaussian as well as
independent and identically distributed (iid).
From the mp disclosed pairs, the parties construct an esti-












which is Gaussianly distributed for sufficiently large mp.
Equivalently, one may write
T̂ = Ĉxy
σ 2x




where Ĉxy estimates the covariance Cxy := 〈xy〉 =
√
τσ 2x .







= T . (77)
For the variance, we may compute













where we use that xiyi are iid (var
∑ = ∑ var), the fact that
the noise has zero mean 〈z〉 = 0 and, finally, that 〈x4〉 = 3σ 4x
for a zero-mean Gaussian variable.
From the square-root transmissivity, Alice and Bob can
derive the estimator of the transmissivity as τ̂ = (T̂ )2, which
is unbiased with variance:














This is shown by noting that, for a Gaussian variable X ∼
N (x̄, σ ), one has var(X 2) = 2σ 2(2x̄ + σ 2). Alternatively, one
uses Eq. (76) and notes that γ̂xy := (Ĉxy)2/σ 2cov with
σ 2cov := var(Ĉxy) ≃ m−1p τσ 4x
[





is a noncentral chi-square distribution χ2(1, λnc), having
one degree of freedom and noncentrality parameter λnc =
C2xy/σ
2
cov (so its mean is 1 + λnc and its variance is 2 + 4λnc).
Computing the variance of τ̂ = γ̂xy(σ 2cov/σ 4x ) up to O(m−2p ),
one gets Eq. (79).
Note that Eq. (78) is in line with the derivation of Ref. [57],
while Ref. [58] resorts to a further approximation that would
lead to the removal of the term 2τ/mp in the expression above.
Here we follow the most conservative choice (approach of
Ref. [57]) which implies a larger uncertainty for the value of
the transmissivity.













For large mp, the variable Yz := mpσ̂ 2z /σ 2z follows a chi-square
distribution χ2(mp) with mp degrees of freedom (mean value













Equivalently, they can build the estimator for the thermal
number n̄ defined by
̂̄n :=
(
σ̂ 2z − νdet
)
/2, (83)












Because the number of degrees of freedom is typically very
large, the chi-square distribution χ2(mp) can also be approxi-
mated by a Gaussian distribution with the same mean value
and variance. As a result, the estimators σ̂ 2z and ̂̄n can be
considered to be asymptotically Gaussian.
It is important to observe that, from an experimental point
of view, the variances in Eqs. (78), (79), (82), and (84) can be
computed by using the estimators T̂ and σ̂ 2z on the right-hand
sides of the equations.
2. Worst-case estimators
From the estimators, Alice and Bob construct suitable
worst-case estimators by assuming a certain number w of
confidence intervals, for some acceptable error probability εpe.
For the square-root transmissivity, they build
T ′ := T̂ − wσT ≃ T − w
√
2τ + σ 2z /σ 2x
mp
. (85)
The probability εpe that the actual value T is less than T
′ is
given by







= 1 − CND(w),
where CND(x) = [1 + erf (x/
√
2)]/2 is the cumulative of the
standard normal distribution. Equivalently, for a given value
of εpe, one derives
w =
√
2 erf−1(1 − 2εpe). (87)
From Eq. (85), one can immediately construct the worst-
case estimator for the transmissivity τ by taking the square
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τ ′ = (T ′)2 so we obtain
τ ′ ≃ τ − 2w
√







Equivalently, this is derived by writing τ ′ := τ̂ − wστ and
then using τ̂ ≃ τ together with στ from Eq. (79).
Because σ̂ 2z and ̂̄n are asymptotically Gaussian, Alice and
Bob can build corresponding worst-case estimators for which
they connect the number w of confidence intervals with the
error probability εpe according to Eq. (87). In particular, they
build the worst-case estimator for the thermal number n̄′ :=
̂̄n + wσn̄, where w is such that εpe = prob(n̄ > n̄′). We easily
compute





As a result, up to an error probability εpe = εpe(w), Alice
and Bob are able to bound the actual values of τ and n̄ with
the worst-case estimators in Eqs. (88) and (89). In the notation
of Sec. III C, this means that we have τ ′ ≃ τ − f (τ, n̄) and
n̄′ ≃ n̄ + g(n̄), where
f (τ, n̄) = 2w
√





(2n̄ + νdet). (91)
Note that εpe is here defined for each basic parameter to be es-
timated, so the total error associated with the two parameters
τ and n̄ is given by εpe(1 − εpe) + (1 − εpe)εpe + ε2pe ≃ 2εpe.
Also note that, for the typical choice εpe = 2−33 ≃ 10−10, we
have w ≃ 6.34.
3. Tail bounds
When the value of εpe is chosen to be very low ( 10
−17),
the approach above creates divergences (w → ∞). In this
case, we must resort to suitable tail bounds. Let us start by
analyzing the estimation of the thermal noise. For the central
chi-square variable Yz ∼ χ2(mp), we may write the following
tail bound [59, Lemma 1]:
prob[Yz  mp − 2√mpx]  e−x, (92)
for any x. Let us combine the latter with Eq. (83). With
probability  e−x, the estimator ̂̄n satisfies





or, equivalently, the actual value n̄ satisfies




≃ ̂̄n + σn̄
√
2x. (94)
Let us set x = ln(1/εpe). Then, with probability  εpe, we
have
n̄  ̂̄n + σn̄
√
2 ln(1/εpe). (95)
Thus, the worst-case value takes the form n̄′ := ̂̄n + wσn̄ as




Note that, in this case, εpe = 2−33 corresponds to w ≃ 6.76,
slightly larger than before. However, now we can also deal
with smaller values of the error probability; e.g., εpe = 10−43
corresponds to w ≃ 14.
Similar extensions can be derived with other tail bounds
[60, Appendix 6.1]. In particular, the derivation can imme-
diately be adapted to the transmissivity. For a variable X ∼
χ2(d, λnc) with d degrees of freedom and noncentrality pa-
rameter λnc, we may write [61] (see also Ref. [60, Lemma 8])
prob[X  (d + λnc) − 2
√
(d + 2λnc)x]  e−x. (97)
Setting x = ln(1/εpe), we then write
prob
[
X  (d + λnc) − 2
√





Take X = γ̂xy ∼ χ2(1,C2xy/σ 2cov). With probability  εpe,
this estimator satisfies













With the same probability, τ̂ = γ̂xy(σ 2cov/σ 4x ) satisfies
τ̂ 







































where in (∗) we have used C2xy ≃ τσ 4x , the scaling σ 2cov ≃
O(m−1p ) and Eq. (80). More precisely, the approximation in
(∗) is certainly valid for 2(mp − 1) ≫ σ 2z /(τσ 2x ), which is the
typical regime of parameters. From Eq. (102), we see that, for
the transmissivity, we have again τ ′ := τ̂ − wστ but where w
is now given in Eq. (96).
E. Finite-size composable key rate
So far, we have considered the effect of parameter esti-
mation on the key rate, so that its expression takes the form
Rpe in Eq. (74), where the worst-case estimators τ
′ and n̄′ are
computed according to Eqs. (88) and (89) with a confidence
parameter w as in Eq. (87) [or Eq. (96) for smaller values of
εpe]. Now we further develop the security analysis and derive
a formula for the composable key rate of a coherent-state pro-
tocol that is valid under conditions of stability for the quantum
channel (no fading). From this point of view, the results of this
section provides the basic tool for the composable security
analysis of a CV-QKD protocol that is implemented over a
stable channel, as is typical in fiber-based implementations.
Assume that the parties exchange N signals over the quan-
tum channel. Because m are publicly sacrificed for parameter
estimation, there are remaining n = N − m signals to be used
for key generation. Besides parameter estimation, any realis-
tic QKD implementation needs to consider error correction
013279-13
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and privacy amplification, which also come with their own
imperfections. First, there is a probability of successful error
correction pec which is less than 1, so only an average of
npec signals are processed into a key. This means that final









Various imperfections arise in the finite-size scenario,
which are summarized in the overall ε security of the protocol
with additive contributions from parameter estimation, error
correction and privacy amplification. Besides εpe, the protocol
has an associated ε correctness εcor (which bounds the residual
probability that the strings are different after passing error
correction) and an associated ε-secrecy εsec (which bounds the
distance between the final key and an ideal output classical-
quantum (CQ) state that is completely decoupled from the
eavesdropper). More technically, one writes εsec = εs + εh,
where εs is a smoothing parameter and εh is a hashing pa-
rameter. All these parameters are set to be small (e.g., 2−33 ≃
10−10) and provide the overall security parameter:
ε = 2pecεpe + εcor + εsec. (104)
Note that pec explicitly multiplies εpe due to the fact that error
correction occurs after parameter estimation. Also note the
factor of 2 before εpe, which accounts for the estimation of
two basic channel parameters.
For a Gaussian-modulated coherent-state protocol [13,14]
with success probability pec and ε security against collective
(Gaussian) attacks [54], we write the following composable
key rate in terms of secret bits per use of the channel (see










where Rpe is given in Eq. (74) and





















with d representing the size of the effective alphabet after
analog-to-digital conversion of sender’s and receiver’s CVs
(quadrature encodings and outcomes). Note that one typically
chooses a five-bit digitalization (d = 25 = 32), so that there
is a negligible discrepancy between the information quantities
computed over discretized and CVs.
In ground-based QKD experiments, the total number of
data points (signals/uses of the channel) can be of the order of
1012 [62]. Thus, data points are split in blocks of suitable size
for data processing, typically of the order of 106 − 107 points.
The success probability pec represents the frequency with
which a block is successfully processed into key generation
and this can also be written as pec = 1 − FER, where FER is
known as the frame error rate.
F. Key rate under general coherent attacks
The rate in Eq. (105) is derived for collective attacks and,
in particular, collective Gaussian attacks, since the Gaussian
assumption is adopted for parameter estimation. This level
of security can be extended to general coherent attacks under
certain symmetries for the protocol, which are satisfied by the
no-switching protocol based on the heterodyne detection [13].
In particular, by combining our rate in Eq. (105) with some of
the tools from Ref. [63], we derive a simple formula for the
composable finite-size key rate under general attacks.
Suppose that the coherent-state protocol P is ε-secure with
finite-size rate R under collective Gaussian attacks, and P can
be symmetrized with respect to a Fock-space representation of
the group of unitary matrices. This symmetrization is equiv-
alent to apply an identical random orthogonal matrix to the
classical CVs of the two parties (encodings and outcomes)
[63], which is certainly possible for the heterodyne-based
protocol [13]. Let us denote by P̃ the symmetrized protocol.
Then, let us assume that the remote parties perform an
energy test T on met randomly chosen pairs of modes. This
test is based on two thresholds, dT for the transmitter, and dR
for the receiver. For each pair, they measure the number of
photons in their local modes and they average these quantities
over their met measurements, so as to compute the local mean
number of photons. If these energies are below the thresholds,
the test is passed (with probability pet); otherwise the protocol
aborts. Now assume that dT is larger than the mean number
of thermal photons n̄T = (μ − 1)/2 associated with the aver-
age thermal state generated by the transmitter. Working with
dT  n̄T + O(m−1/2et ) implies that the test is almost certainly
successful (pet ≃ 1) for sufficiently large values of met. Also
note that, for a lossy channel with reasonably small excess
noise, the receiver will get an average number of photons
which is clearly less than that of the transmitter, which means
that a successful value for dR can be chosen to be equal to dT .
(In our numerical investigations, we set dR = dT ≃ n̄T .)
By taking the local dimensions large enough we have pet ≃
1 and the overall success of the protocol remains unchanged,
i.e., we have pec pet ≃ pec. Then, the parties go ahead with
the symmetrized protocol P̃ which will now use n = N − m̃
modes for key generation, where m̃ := m + met. This already
introduces a modification in Eq. (105), where the effective
number n of modes for key generation will be reduced in the







By setting met = fetn for some factor fet < 1, the total number
of key generation signals takes the form
n = N − m
1 + fet
. (109)
The second modification consists of an additional step of
privacy amplification which reduces the final number of secret
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where













Accounting for the two modifications above, we have that
the key rate Rhet of Eq. (105), specified for the heterodyne










where Rhetpe is Rpe of Eq. (74) for the heterodyne protocol.
The rate established in Eq. (113) is valid for a symmetrized
coherent-state protocol P̃ with heterodyne detection [13],
which is now secure against general coherent attacks, with
modified epsilon security equal to [63]
ε′ = K4n ε/50, (114)
and probability of success pec ≃ pec pet. Note that, because
Kn ≃ O(n), we need to start with a very small value for ε
so that the final epsilon-security ε′ remains well below 1 and
the term n in Eq. (113) does not explode. In particular, this
means that εpe needs to be very small (e.g., ≃ 10−43) and
the corresponding confidence parameter w must be computed
from Eq. (96).
IV. COMPOSABLE SECURITY AND KEY RATES FOR
FREE-SPACE CV-QKD
A. Preliminary considerations
Here we extend the previous theory (Sec. III) to account for
the channel fluctuations that generally affect free-space quan-
tum communications. We consider free-space fading where
the transmissivity τ is not stable but varies over a time scale of
the order of 100 ms or similar. Because of this issue, the first
important physical condition is that the setups need to have
system clocks and detectors that are suitably fast to collect
enough statistics while the value of τ fluctuates.
In a general fading process, the instantaneous transmissiv-
ity τ between transmitter and receiver follows a probability
distribution P0(τ ), which takes the specific expression in
Eq. (25) when the physical aspects of the free-space commu-
nication are taken into account. The probability that τ falls





dτ P0(τ ). (115)
This means that only a small fraction pδm of the signals can
be used for estimating this value of τ . (From now on, when
we write a postselected quantity like pδm, we implicitly mean
an integer approximation of it.)
As we can see from Eq. (79), the error variance σ 2τ in
the estimation of τ scales as O(m−1). Here this becomes
O[(pδm)
−1], with the problem of leading to insufficient statis-
tics. We can overcome this issue by introducing energetic
pilot pulses specifically dedicated to track the instantaneous
transmissivity of the channel so that we can create suitable
bins for collecting signals with almost equal transmissivity.
These bins are then subject to a suitable postprocessing that
we call defading.
Another preliminary consideration is about noise filtering.
As already mentioned in Sec. II E 1, one can effectively nar-
row the frequency filter of the receiver to match the bandwidth
of the LO, thanks to the interferometric process occurring
in the homodyne/heterodyne setup. Thus, instead of being
limited to a physical filter of 1 nm around 800 nm at the re-
ceiver’s aperture, the detector imposes a much narrower filter
of 0.1 pm, by interfering the signal with the 10-ns-long and
50-GHz-wide pulse of the LO, close to the time-bandwidth
product. Such a process is secure as long as the projection
of the homodyne detectors does not create correlations with
the frequencies outside the bandwidth of the LO, since these
extra frequencies could be used as Trojan-horse modes. In
realistic implementations, such cross talk is/can be made
negligible. As a result, thanks to the use of the LO (as TLO or
LLO), the parties are able to suppress the external background
noise (down to n̄B ≃ 10−7 in daylight conditions with typical
parameters). For this reason, one can make the numerical
approximation
n̄B ≪ 1, n̄ ≃ n̄ex. (116)
B. Loss tracking via random pilots
For free-space parameter estimation, the parties sacrifice
not only m signal pulses (as before in Sec. III) but also addi-
tional mP energetic pilot pulses. The mP pilots are specifically
used for the quasiperfect estimation of the (generally variable)
transmissivity τ , so as to track its instantaneous value. In this
way, the parties can create a lattice of suitably narrow bins of
transmissivity for signal classification (discussed in the next
subsection).
The pilots are prepared in exactly the same coherent state
|n̄1/2P eiπ/4〉 and randomly transmitted during the quantum
communication. In a TLO setup, both signals and pilots are
multiplexed with their LOs. As previously discussed, the LO
can be very bright, with mean number of photons n̄LO of the
order 107 at the receiver even after 20 dB of loss (this is
for 10-ns-long pulses from a 100-mW laser at λ = 800 nm).
This means that relatively-energetic pilots can be generated
with just a 10−4 fraction of the LO energy (so that n̄P ≃ 103
photons are collected by the receiver). In this way, the pilots
are bright enough to provide an excellent estimate of τ , while
the LO remains so much brighter that the measurements of the
pilots will still be shot-noise limited. In an LLO setup, the ref-
erence pulses for the local LO reconstruction are transmitted
at the odd uses of the channel, while the pilots are randomly
interleaved with the signals at the even uses of the channel.
In a small fading interval δτ , we have pδmP pilots to be
used for the estimation of τ . From these pilots, the parties
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with mean
√
τ and variance σ 2z /(2n̄P pδmPνdet). The latter
variance goes to zero for suitably large n̄P, so the parties
achieve a practically perfect estimate of τ already for mP ≃
O(1). In other words, we may consider T̂P =
√
τ , meaning
that the parties can perform real-time tracking of the trans-
missivity τ with negligible error.
C. Postselection interval and lattice allocation
While monitoring the transmissivity τ with the pilots, the
parties only keep the data points exchanged within an agreed
postselection interval  := [τmin, τmax], with associated prob-
ability p = p(τmin, τmax) as computed from Eq. (115). Thus,
from a total of N exchanged pulses, only a portion S :=
(N − mP)p of signals is selected for further processing.
The interval is chosen so that S ≫ 1, leading to sufficient
statistics for parameter estimation. The parties may choose
τmax = η := ηstηatmηeff, which is the maximum value achiev-
able by a perfectly aligned beam, and then take τmin = fthη for
a threshold value fth ∈ (0, 1).
Within the postselection interval , Alice and Bob intro-
duce a regular lattice with step δτ so that there are a number of
transmissivity slots/bins k := [τk, τk+1] with τk := τmin +
(k − 1)δτ , for k = 1, . . . , M and M = (τmax − τmin)/δτ . In
this coarse graining of the transmissivity, each slot k is
populated with probability pk = p(τk, τk+1) according to the
fading distribution in Eq. (115). This means that slot k has
Sk := (N − mP)pk signals to be used for parameter estima-
tion and key generation. For a sufficiently narrow slot, these
signals provide νdetSk pairs of points {xi, yi} that satisfy the
input-output relation
yk ≃ √τkx + zk, (118)
where zk = z(τk ) is a noise variable [cf. Eq. (48)] with vari-
ance
σ 2z (τk ) := var(zk ) = 2n̄(τk ) + νdet. (119)
A potential strategy consists of processing each slot k
independently from the others, by performing parameter esti-
mation over a corresponding set of sacrificed signals, and then
going through the next steps of data processing. This approach
is based on the fact that we can consider the transmissivity τk
and the noise-variance σ 2z (τk ) to be approximately constant
for all data points in the same slot (so there is a well-defined
thermal-loss channel associated with it). In turn, this means
that we can directly apply the procedures of Sec. III valid for a
stable quantum channel. As a result, each slot k will provide
a slot rate Rk with corresponding epsilon security εk . The total





pk max{0, Rk}, (120)
with total security ε = ∑Mk=1 pkεk . Because this solution may
suffer from insufficient statistics in the various slots, we adopt
the procedure of the following subsection.
FIG. 5. Defading of data. See text for details.
D. Defading
The parties can process their data to eliminate the fading
and create an overall stable channel at the cost of using the
minimum transmissivity within the post-selection interval.
This procedure of defading is one of the possible strategies
and is used to provide an achievable lower bound for the secret
key rate.
In this procedure, Bob maps all his νdetSk data points
yk from the generic kth slot k to the first slot 1 in the
post-selection interval, by using the following downlift trans-
formation




yk = √τminx + z′k, (121)
where z′k is a Gaussian noise variable with variance var(z′k ) =
σ 2z (τk )τmin/τk . See also Fig. 5.
While Eq. (121) is certainly a valid postprocessing of data,
it is not guaranteed that the entire input-output transformation
x → y′k can be made equivalent to the action of a quan-
tum channel (which is a useful condition for our theoretical
treatment). This is due to the noise reduction induced by
the rescaling τmin/τk  1, which means that var(z
′k ) might
become < νdet, violating the minimum noise associated with
the final quantum measurement.
This problem is solved if Bob applies a classical Gaus-
sian channel y′k → y′′k := y′k + ξ kadd with additive noise
var(ξ kadd) = (1 − τmin/τk )νdet. In this way, Bob generates
y′′k = √τminx + z′′k, (122)
where z′′k is a Gaussian variable with variance
σ 2k := var(z′′k ) = 2n̄(τk )τmin/τk + νdet  νdet. (123)
We see that the transformation yk → y′′k is a slot-
dependent beam-splitter channel Ck performed over the data,
with transmissivity ιk := τmin/τk and environmental noise
variance equal to νdet. Equivalently, this can be represented by
a virtual beam splitter directly applied to the pulses allocated
to slot k followed by the measurement. In other words, Alice
and Bob’s input-output relation x → y′′k is equivalent to the
action of a composite Gaussian channel Fk := Ck ◦ Ek , where
Ek is a thermal-loss channel with transmissivity τk and thermal
number n̄(τk ), followed by Bob’s measurement.
Assuming that the transformation yk → y′′k is performed
for all the M slots of the interval, Bob creates a new variable
y′′ which satisfies
y′′ = √τminx + z′′, (124)
where z′′ is non-Gaussian. Since x → y → y′′ is a Markov
chain, Bob’s postprocessing can only decrease the mutual
information I (x : y′′)  I (x : y). The noise variable z′′ can be
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written as an ensemble {πk, z′′k}, with the independent ele-
ment z′′k being selected with probability πk = pk/p. Thus, it












Overall, the transformation of Eq. (124) is equivalently ob-
tained by measuring the output of a non-Gaussian channel F ,
which is described by the ensemble {πk,Fk} and assumed to
be completely controlled by Eve.
Due to the optimality of collective Gaussian attacks for
Gaussian-modulated coherent-state protocols, the parties may
assume the worst-case scenario where the non-Gaussian chan-
nel F is replaced by a thermal-loss Gaussian channel Eτmin,n̄G







so that it has noise variance σ 2G = 2n̄G + νdet equal to σ 2z′′ of
Eq. (125). This means that the noise variable z′′ in Eq. (124)
can be replaced by a Gaussian variable zG, and the total input-
output relation is assumed to be
y′′ = √τminx + zG. (127)
Thus, we lower bound Alice and Bob’s performance by
considering the postprocessed variables {x, y′′} connected by
the input-output relation of Eq. (127), after defading and as-
suming a Gaussian attack (Gaussianification). This leads to
the asymptotic key rate,
Rasy = βI (x : y′′)τmin,n̄G − χ (E : y′′)τmin,n̄G , (128)
which can be computed from Eq. (73). The explicit expres-
sions for the mutual information I and the Holevo bound χ
are given in Secs. III A and III C for the homodyne (Rhomasy ) and
heterodyne protocols (Rhetasy) [64].
Because we have reduced the fading process to a stable
thermal-loss channel Eτmin,n̄G , we can exploit the methodology
of Sec. III. In particular, we can apply the tools of Sec. III D
to compute the estimators and worst-case estimators for τmin
and n̄G, to be employed in the key rate.
E. Estimating the channel parameters
In the parameter estimation step, Alice and Bob sacrifice
some of their signals to estimate the actual values of the
minimum transmissivity τmin = T 2min and the Gaussian noise
σ 2G (or n̄G) up to an acceptable error probability. Note that,
in general, the actual value of τmin might be different from
what determined via the pilots, which means that its esti-
mation via the signals is needed. In fact, Eve might try to
use a QND measurement to distinguish between pilots and
signals. After such QND measurement (with loss τk), Eve
may apply an additional measurement (with loss τ̃ ) only to
the signals. This means that, after defading, the input-output
relation of Eq. (127) would become ỹ′′ = √τ̃minx + z̃G, with
lower transmissivity τ̃min := τ̃ τmin and generally higher noise
z̃G.
Because parameter estimation is performed over a subset
of the signals, the parties will detect these discrepancies with
respect to the pilots. Most importantly, they will derive the
corresponding estimators for the lower transmissivity τ̃min and
the different noise levels to be used in the calculation of their
secret key. Of course, Eve might be more disruptive over
the signals so their transmissivity might be sensibly different
from that of the corresponding pilots, but the point is that any
such a perturbation will be anyway detected and estimated
by the parties. If the discrepancy between pilots and signals
is too strong, the noise level detected by the parties becomes
too high for secure communication (denial of service). In the
following, we make the realistic assumption that Eve acts uni-
versally over pilots and signals, so τ̃min = τmin. However, we
point out that this is only a simplification, not a limitation of
the approach whose application to τ̃min = τmin is immediate.
To create their estimators, the parties sacrifice mp sig-
nals from those they have postselected. This corresponds to
m := νdetmp pairs of data points {x, y′′}, and we can also
write m =
∑M
k=1 mk , where mk := νdetmpk is the contribu-
tion coming from the generic slot k . In writing mp, we
implicitly assume that m is the equivalent number of signals
that would have been sacrificed by the parties in the absence of
postselection. This notation is theoretically useful to describe
scenarios where the same protocol (with fixed m) is imple-
mented over different distances over which the value of p
can be optimized.


















It is easy to check that this is unbiased (i.e., its mean is ≃ Tmin)
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Let us build an estimator for the variance σ 2G of the thermal






























where Yk is distributed according to a χ
2 distribution with mk
degrees of freedom. It is easy to check that the estimator is








σ 2k 〈Yk〉 ≃ σ 2G. (139)

















Equivalently, in terms of number of thermal photons n̄G :=
(σ 2G − νdet)/2, we write the estimator
̂̄nG :=
(
σ̂ 2G − νdet
)
/2, (141)
which is unbiased 〈 ̂̄nG〉 ≃ n̄G with var( ̂̄nG) = var(σ̂ 2G)/4.
It is important to note that all the mean values and variances
above are computable by the parties by replacing estimators
on the right-hand sides of the formulas. In fact, once T̂min and
σ̂ 2G have been computed, these can be replaced in Eq. (135)
to provide var(T̂min). To compute var(σ̂
2
G), the parties need to











whose squares go in Eq. (140).
F. Worst-case estimators and bounds
According to Eq. (127), Alice and Bob’s postprocessed
data is generated by a thermal-loss channel Eτmin,n̄G with trans-
missivity τmin and thermal number n̄G. For the transmissivity














n̄′G := ̂̄nG + w
√
var( ̂̄nG), (144)
where the confidence parameter w is connected to the error
εpe according to Eqs. (87) or (96).
For the sake of the theoretical analysis, it is useful to
introduce bounds for τ ′min and n̄
′
G. Consider the worst-case
noise variance σ 2wc = 2n̄wc + νdet such that σ 2wc  σ 2k for any
slot k. Then, we may write
var(T̂min) 
2τmin + σ 2wc/σ 2x
m
, (145)




As a result, we have the bounds
τ ′min  τLB := τmin − 2w
√
2τ 2min + τminσ 2wc/σ 2x
m
, (147)




Let us now evaluate the worst-case thermal number n̄wc to
be used in the bounds above. We write
n̄wc = ηeffn̄B + n̄ex,wc, (149)
where n̄ex,wc := n̄ex(τwc)  n̄ex(τ ) is computed over the
worst-case value τwc. The latter may be chosen to be τwc =
τmin for the TLO and τwc = τmax for the LLO (due to the fact
that n̄ex(τ ) has different monotonicity in τ , as discussed in
Sec. III B 3). In other words, for n̄ex,wc, we may consider the
two estimates
n̄TLOex,wc ≃ el/τmin, (150)
n̄LLOex,wc ≃ el + πτmaxσ 2x C−1lW, (151)
where el is the electronic noise term in Eq. (61).
In our numerical investigations, we assume the bounds
τLB and n̄UB in Eqs. (147) and (148), which take different
expressions for TLO and LLO depending on Eqs. (150) and
(151). Since each of these worst-case estimators is correct
up to an error εpe, the total error affecting the procedure of
parameter estimation is ≃ 2εpe.
G. Composable key rate for free-space CV-QKD
Let us summarize the scenario. Alice and Bob perform
a Gaussian-modulated coherent-state (homodyne or hetero-
dyne) protocol with variance σ 2x = μ − 1 over a free-space
channel with instantaneous transmissivity ηch and background
thermal noise n̄B. The receiver has setup efficiency ηeff and
setup noise n̄ex, so the total thermal noise is n̄ = ηeffn̄B + n̄ex.
The overall instantaneous transmissivity from Alice to Bob
is given by τ = ηchηeff and it fluctuates following a fading
distribution P0(τ ) as in Eq. (25). Because n̄ex = n̄ex(τ ) (see
Sec. III B 3), we also have thermal-noise fluctuations n̄ =
n̄(τ ). The physical scenario is depicted in Fig. 1, and also
modelled in Fig. 4 for each fixed value of the transmissivity.
Alice sends to Bob a total of N pulses which are multi-
plexed with an LO in polarization (TLO) or in time (LLO).
Note that in terms of throughput (bits/sec), given by the rate
(bits/use) times the clock C (uses/sec), one should account
for the additional uses of the link associated with the LO.
Thus, there is a factor of 1/2 for the LLO, unless this is com-
pensated by using two polarizations for the quantum signals
(see Sec. III B 1).
Within the total set of N pulses, there are mP pilots that
are prepared in a bright coherent state and are randomly
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interleaved with the N − mP signal pulses. Thanks to these
pilots, the parties monitor the instantaneous transmissivity
τ and they create a postselection interval  := [τmin, τmax],
where τmax = η := ηstηatmηeff is the maximum value achiev-
able and τmin = fthη for some threshold value fth ∈ (0, 1).
The interval  postselects a portion S = (N − mP)p of the
signals, where the probability p = p(τmin, τmax) is given in
Eq. (115). Then, the interval is further divided into a lattice
of M slots with small step δτ , in such a way that each slot
k := [τk, τk+1] collects signals with almost-equal transmis-
sivity τ ≃ τk := τmin + (k − 1)δτ .
The postselected S signals provide νdetS pairs of data
points {xi, yi} where x is Alice’s generic quadrature encoding
and y is Bob’s corresponding decoding. The outcomes {yi} are
all mapped into the first slot 1 with minimum transmissivity
τmin, by means of the de-fading channel y → y′′ described in
Sec. IV D. As a result, Alice and Bob’s data points satisfy the
input-output relation y′′ = √τminx + zG of Eq. (127), which is
equivalent to a thermal-loss channel Eτmin,n̄G with transmissiv-
ity τmin and thermal number n̄G, so that σ
2
G = 2n̄G + νdet.
Alice and Bob sacrifice mp signals to derive worst-case
estimators τ ′min and n̄
′
G according to Eqs. (143) and (144),
where the confidence parameter w is determined by the error
εpe according to Eqs. (87) or (96). These estimators are used
to compute the asymptotic key rate affected by parameter
estimation
Rpe = Rasy(τ ′min, n̄′G), (152)
where Rasy is given in Eq. (128). For the theoretical analysis,
we consider the further lower bound
Rpe  RLB := Rasy(τLB, n̄UB), (153)
which is based on τLB and n̄UB from Eqs. (147) and (148).
The signals remaining for key generation are np, where
n = N − (m + mP). Thus, after parameter estimation, the par-
ties process their npνdet key generation points {xi, y′′i } via
the procedures of error correction and privacy amplification.
Depending on the reconciliation parameter β (related to the
rate of the error-correcting code) and the correctness εcor (re-
lated to the probability of residual errors in Alice’s and Bob’s
corrected strings), the step of error correction has an associ-
ated success probability pec to promote the block of points
to the next step of privacy amplification. The latter procedure
is ideal (i.e., decouples Eve) up to an error quantified by the
secrecy parameter εsec = εs + εh, in turn decomposed into a
smoothing (εs) and a hashing parameter (εh). After privacy
amplification, an average number of np pec signals contribute
to the final key, leading to an overall factor np pec/N in front
of the rate.
The composable finite-size key rate associated with the












where the two terms aep and  are given in Eqs. (106) and
(107) for some value log2 d of digitalization. This rate is ε se-
cure against collective Gaussian attacks, where ε = 2pecεpe +
εcor + εsec. The expression of the key rate in Eq. (154) can be
specified for the homodyne/heterodyne protocol and for the
two types of LO (TLO/LLO).
For the heterodyne protocol, we can extend the key rate
to composable finite-size security against general coherent
attacks (see Sec. III F). This is done by adopting a suitable
symmetrization and including energy tests, both operations
to be performed on the data points {xi, y′′i }. The number of
energy tests is set to be pmet, where met = fetn for some
factor fet < 1. Thus, the final key generation signals will be
np pec with
n = N − (m + mP + met) =
N − (m + mP)
1 + fet
. (155)












where the extra term n is defined as in Eq. (110) and is
expressed in terms of Kn of Eq. (111), for which we choose
the dimensions dR = dT ≃ n̄T = σ 2x /2 (in such a way that the
energy test succeeds with probability pet ≃ 1).
Note that the key rate Rhetgen is secure up to an epsilon secu-
rity ε′ = K4npε/50. This means that, to get ε′ ≃ 10−10 against
general attacks, we need to start from a security of ε ≃ 10−43
against collective Gaussian attacks. In turn, this also implies
εpe ≃ 10−43, meaning that we need to use Eq. (96) for the
worst-case estimators.
H. Numerical simulations
In our numerical investigations, we consider the hetero-
dyne protocol for which we study the free-space composable
key rate under collective and coherent attacks, assuming the
two types of LO. The free-space model is the same as in Sec. II
and depicted in Fig. 1. We consider the z propagation of a
collimated Gaussian beam which is subject to diffraction, at-
mospheric extinction ηatm [as quantified by the Beer-Lambert
equation of Eq. (5)], pointing error σ 2P ≃ (10−6z)2 (for an
error of 1μrad at the transmitter), and Rytov-Yura weak tur-
bulence (σ 2Rytov < 1) under the H-V model of atmosphere (see
Appendix C). Turbulence leads to beam broadening, with
short-term transmissivity ηst, and centroid wandering, with
variance σ 2TB. Including the setup efficiency ηeff, we have
a maximum transmissivity η := ηstηatmηeff when the beam
is perfectly aligned. The overall wandering, with variance
σ 2 = σ 2P + σ 2TB, leads to the distribution P0(τ ) of Eq. (25)
for the instantaneous transmissivity τ of the link. Thermal
background follows the description of Sec. II D for cloudy
daytime conditions (but suppressed by the homodyne filter).
In particular, we assume the physical parameters listed in
Table I.
The steps of the protocol are those explained in the previ-
ous subsection, where Alice and Bob assume a postselection
interval  := [τmin, τmax] with τmax = η and τmin = fthη for
some threshold value fth ∈ (0, 1). In particular, we choose the
parameters listed in Table II.
As we can see from Fig. 6(a), the composable key rates
against collective attacks are sufficiently high, even though
these values actually represent lower bounds to what achiev-
able by Alice and Bob. As a matter of fact, in most of the
weak-turbulence range, these rates are within one order of
magnitude of the ultimate loss-based upper bound of Eq. (27)
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TABLE I. Physical parameters.
Physical parameter Symbol Value
Beam curvature R0 ∞
Wavelength λ 800 nm
Beam spot size w0 5 cm
Receiver aperture aR 5 cm
Receiver field of view fov 10
−10 sr
Homodyne filter λ 0.1 pm
Detector efficiency ηeff 0.5
Detector bandwidth W 100 MHz
Noise equivalent power NEP 6 pW/
√
Hz
Linewidth lW 1.6 KHz
LO power PLO 100 mW
Clock C 5 MHz
Pulse duration t,tLO 10 ns
Altitude h 30 m
Structure constant (day) C2n 2.06 × 10−14 m−2/3
Background noise
(day, λ = 0.1 pm) n̄B 4.75 × 10
−7
which is plotted as red dashed line in Fig. 2(a), computed for
daytime and the same physical parameters considered here. In
Fig. 6(a), we study the rates that are achievable with the TLO
and the LLO. In one setting (solid curves), we fix the value of
the threshold parameter for postselection fth to 84% and we
also fix the value of the input Gaussian modulation (μ = 20
for TLO and μ = 8.4 for LLO). These values are chosen to
maximize the rates at the maximum distance z = 1066 m but
they are not the optimal choices for the other distances. In
another approach, we maximize the rates over fth and μ at
each distance, finding substantially improved performances
(dashed lines).
In Fig. 6(b), we plot the composable key rates achievable
against general attacks assuming no optimization in fth and μ.
On the one hand, these rates are not far from the correspond-
ing results against collective attacks. On the other hand, the
choice of parameters in Table II may be far more challenging
for this general case (e.g., in terms of β and pec for such a
low value of εcor). Also note that the final epsilon security
TABLE II. Protocol parameters.
Protocol parameter Symbol Collective attacks General attacks
Total pulses N 5 × 107 5 × 107
Pilot pulses mP 0.1 × N 0.1 × N
PE signals m 0.1 × N 0.1 × N
Energy tests fet − 0.2
KG signals n 0.8 × N ≃ 3.33 × 107
Digitalization d 25 25
Rec. efficiency β 0.98 0.98
EC success prob pec 0.9 0.5
Epsilons εh,s,... 2
−33 ≃ 10−10 10−43
Confidence w ≃ 6.34 ≃ 14.07




Threshold fth variable 0.84
(a)
(b)
FIG. 6. Composable secret-key rates (bits/use) versus distance
(m) for free-space QKD in the regime of weak turbulence and for
cloudy daytime operation. We consider a coherent-state protocol
with heterodyne detection, pilot-guided and operated in postselection
as described in the main text. Physical and protocol parameters are
listed in Tables I and II. (a) We plot the secret key rate of Eq. (154)
assuming a TLO (black curves) and an LLO (blue curves). In par-
ticular, we plot the performances at fixed postselection threshold
fth = 0.84 and fixed input modulation, μ = 20 for TLO and μ = 8.4
for LLO (solid curves). These are chosen to optimize the rates at the
maximum distance (z = 1066 m). We compare these performances
with those achievable by optimizing the rates over μ and fth at
each distance (dashed curves). (b) We plot the rate of Eq. (156)
against general attacks for TLO (black line) and LLO (blue line).
These performances are not optimized and refer to fixed threshold
fth = 0.84 and input modulation (μ = 20 for TLO and μ = 8.4 for
LLO).
ε′ depends on the distance. For the parameters chosen, this
ranges from ≃ 1.38 × 10−11 for the LLO at z = 1066 m and
≃ 1.32 × 10−9 for the TLO at z = 200 m.
A final important observation (already mentioned be-
fore but here relevant to stress) is that the rates shown in
Fig. 6 refer to bits per use of the quantum communica-
tion channel, without accounting for the transmission of the
LO reference pulses. If we include the clock of the system
(uses/second) and compute the throughput of the commu-
nication (bits/second), then we need to include the uses of
the link dedicated to the LO. Thus, for the LLO, we should
halve the final rate (with respect to the TLO) due to the time
multiplexing of the LO. However, it is also true that, with the
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LLO, one could use both polarizations in the transmission of
the signals, so the factor of 1/2 in the final rate can be fully
compensated.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, we have established the ultimate bounds
for free-space quantum communications under general con-
ditions of diffraction, atmospheric extinction, pointing errors,
turbulence, and background thermal noise. We first developed
the theory for the regime of weak turbulence, crucial for free
space ground-communications in a relatively short range, and
then extended the results to the case of stronger turbulence.
In the short range, we have then derived achievable and
composable key rates for free-space CV-QKD, proving that
these rates are sufficiently close to the ultimate limits. This
shows the robustness and suitability of free-space channels for
implementing high-rate quantum-secured communications.
The achievable rates are derived by first formulating
a general theory of composable finite-size security for
Gaussian-modulated coherent-state protocols under condi-
tions of channel stability, then extending this theory to
considering fading (non Gaussian) channels, which can be
dealt via the introduction of pilot modes and suitable post-
processing techniques. In this way, we have been able to
handle the difficult step of parameter estimation and to reduce
the problem to the easier framework of a stable Gaussian
channel. Fully assessing the practical security of CV-QKD in
strong turbulent channels is an interesting future direction of
investigation.
In conclusion, our paper not only established the ultimate
limits and benchmarks for free-space quantum communi-
cations but also provided a comprehensive machinery for
studying the composable finite-size security of CV-QKD pro-
tocols both in stable conditions (e.g., in standard fiber-based
connections) and unstable conditions (i.e., in free-space links
subject to fading effects).
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APPENDIX A: PROPAGATION OF GAUSSIAN BEAMS
Most of the contents of this Appendix are basic notions of
quantum optics. They are given here to set the general notation
of the paper and for the sake of completeness.
1. Free-space diffraction
Consider an optical bosonic mode with wavelength λ, an-
gular frequency ω = 2πc/λ, and wave number k = ω/c =
2π/λ. Under the scalar approximation (single and uniform
polarization) and the paraxial wave approximation, the elec-
tric field takes the form
E (x, y, z, t ) = u(x, y, z) exp[i(kz − ωt )], (A1)
where the field amplitude u(x, y, z) is a slowly varying func-
tion in the longitudinal propagation direction z, with x and
y being the transverse coordinates and t the time coordinate.
The possible expressions for the field amplitude u must satisfy
the Fresnel-Kirchoff integral in the Fresnel approximation [6,
Eq. (4.6.9)]. A solution of this integral which maintains its
functional form, i.e., an eigensolution, is the Gaussian beam.
In particular, assume free-space propagation along the z
direction with no limiting apertures in the transverse plane, for
which we introduce the radial coordinate r =
√
x2 + y2. Then,
the lowest order (TEM00) single-mode Gaussian beam takes a
simple analytical expression. At the initial position z = 0, its
field amplitude has the form





where w0 is the beam spot size and R0 is the phase-front
radius of curvature. For beam spot size, we precisely mean
the field spot size, corresponding to the radial distance at
which the amplitude of the field decays to 1/e of its maxi-
mum value. Note that the intensity of the beam is given by
I (0, r) = exp (−2r2/w20 ), and one can define an intensity spot
size wI0 = w0/
√
2 that is also widely used in the literature
(e.g., in Refs. [25,29]).













so the far-field regime (z ≫ zR) corresponds to f ≪ 1. Fol-
lowing the notation of Ref. [15], we also introduce the Fresnel
ratio  := f −1 and the curvature parameter 0 := 1 − z/R0.
Note that a collimated beam (R0 = +∞) corresponds to 0 =
1, while a convergent beam (R0 > 0) to 0 < 1, and a diver-
gent beam (R0 < 0) to 0 > 1.
In terms of the previous parameters, we can write the field
at any distance z as [15,16]






exp [−ikr2/(2Rz ) − iφz], (A5)
where ωz is the spot size at position z, Rz is the corresponding
curvature at z, and φz is its longitudinal phase at z, also known














0(1 − 0) − 2
, (A7)
φz = tan−1(/0). (A8)
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A typical assumption is to adopt the planar approximation
of a collimated beam at the transmitter (0 = 1). In such a
case, it is immediate to check that
w
2
z = w20[1 + (z/zR)2], (A11)
Rz = −z[1 + (zR/z)2], (A12)
φz = tan−1(z/zR). (A13)
Note that w2z is the sum of the initial (minimum) condition
w
2
0 and a term w
2
0 (z/zR)
2 which is due to diffraction. In the
far-field, the latter term is dominant and we have




which increases linearly with the distance z. Defining beam
divergence as θ := wz/z, we write θ ≃ λ/(πw0), which in-
creases with the wavelength (as expected). For a collimated
beam, the curvature is minimal at z = zR and then goes as
≃ z at large distances, meaning that the beam asymptotically
becomes a spherical wave.
From Eq. (A5), we see that the beam intensity at longitudi-
nal distance z is given by




, Izmax := w20/w2z . (A15)
Assume that the beam is orthogonally intercepted by a re-
ceiver, which is described as a sharped-edged circular aperture
with radial size aR, therefore, with total detection area πa
2
R.
Let us compute the total power impinging on the finite-size
detector by integrating over the radial coordinates 0  r  aR













where Pz := (πw2z Izmax)/2 represents the total power in the op-
tical beam at distance z (corresponding to a receiver of infinite
radius aR → ∞). Note that we may also rewrite Eq. (A15) as











The diffraction-limited transmissivity ηd associated with
the finite size of the receiver is given by





where we may explicitly express w2z as in Eq. (A9). In the far
field, we have  ≫ 1 in Eq. (A6), so wz ≫ w0. Assuming that
the receiver’s aperture radius aR is comparable to the spot size
w0, then we have wz ≫ aR and we can expand Eq. (A18) into






In particular, for a collimated beam, we can use the approxi-
mation in Eq. (A14) and write the far-field expression:





Recognizing that A0 = πw20 and AR = πa2R as the effective
transversal areas of the beam and the receiver’s aperture, we
note that we may write Eq. (A20) as ηd ≃ 2 f0R, where
f0R := A0AR/(λz)2 (A21)
is the Fresnel number product associated with the beam and
the receiver.
2. Diffraction at the transmitter
Any realistic transmitter involves an aperture with finite
radius aT . This means that the Gaussian profile of the beam
could be truncated outside that radius causing diffraction.
However, if the aperture aT is sufficiently larger than w0,
diffraction becomes negligible.
Assume that the transmitter has a plane exit pupil A0 of
area A0 while the receiver has an entrance pupil Az of area Az.
We consider the quasimonochromatic approximation where
the transmitter excites planar modes within a narrow band of
frequencies, centered around the carrier (angular) frequency
ω, and the receiver only detects planar modes within this
bandwidth. We then consider the usual scalar approximation
(i.e., a single and uniform polarization) and the paraxial wave
approximation (so that the transverse components of the wave
vector are negligible at the receiver).
Let us write x := (x, y) ∈ A0 to be the transverse coor-
dinates at the transmitter and x′ := (x′, y′) ∈ Az those at the
receiver. The electric field at the transmitter can then be ex-
pressed as [65]
E0(x, t ) =
∑
k,l
âk,lk (x)l (t ), (A22)
where k (x)l (t ) are orthonormal spatiotemporal modes
defined over A0 and 0  t  tmax, with tmax being the
time duration of the transmitter’s signal. These modes have
corresponding annihilation operators âk,l . Thanks to this
normal-mode decomposition, one can express the electric
field at the receiver, which is given by [65]
Ez(x






1 − ηk êk,l
)
× k (x′)l (t − c−1z) (A23)
for modes defined over Az and 0  t − c−1z  tmax. Above,
êk,l are the annihilation operators associated with environmen-
tal modes impinging on the pupil of the receiver, which are
generally described by thermal states.
Free-space diffraction-limited quantum communication
can therefore be completed described by the input-output
relations




1 − ηk êk,l , (A24)
which correspond to a collection of thermal-loss channels
(beam-splitter transformations with thermal environment). It







which is equal the Fresnel number product nf of the two pupils
[65, Eq. (37)]. In the far-field regime (nf ≪ 1), only one mode
is effectively transmitted from transmitter to receiver, with
transmissivity ηfar ≃ nf.
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From Eq. (A26), we see that we obtain the far-field
collimated-beam transmissivity in Eq. (A20) by setting aT =√
2w0 ≃ 1.41w0. In other words, by choosing such a value
for the transmitter’s aperture, we may neglect its far-field
contribution to diffraction from the point of view of the trans-
missivity (otherwise aT = w0 would cause a 3dB loss). That
being said, the choice aT =
√
2w0 may still be too generous
because the profile of the Gaussian beam could be affected
in the far field by non-negligible intensity ripples and peak
intensity reductions.
To preserve the Gaussian profile with excellent approxi-
mation, a more conservative choice is aT  2w0, e.g., aT ≃
2.3w0 [5, Sec. 17.1]. Let us write Eq. (A16) at z = 0 for the
transmitter’s aperture aT . Then, we see that the total power
passing through the transmitter is given by P0(1 − e−2a2T /w20 ).
If we choose aT  2w0, then  99.97% of P0 is transmitted.
This estimate provides an idea of the extremely small per-




Quantum mechanically, the propagation of the Gaus-
sian beam from transmitter to receiver can be represented
by a single mode whose annihilation operator â at the
transmitter undergoes the following input-output Bogoliubov
transformation:
â → b̂ = √ηdâ +
√
1 − ηdê, (B1)
where b̂ is the annihilation operator of the signal mode at the
receiver and ê is the annihilation operator of an environmental
mode impinging on the receiver and coupling with the output
signal mode. Mode ê is generally described by a thermal
state whose mean number of photons n̄e depends on vari-
ous factors. Its typical values largely vary between nighttime
and daytime operations, weather conditions, etc. The basic
process described in Eq. (B1) is also known as single-mode
thermal-loss channel [3], here denoted by E n̄eηd . (Note that, in
the main text and other parts of these Appendices, we use
the different notation Eηd,n̄ to indicate a thermal-loss channel
with transmissivity ηd and n̄e = n̄/(1 − ηd), implying that n̄
thermal photons are added to its output).
To give a universal upper bound which is valid in ev-
ery condition, we neglect thermal noise, so that Eq. (B1)





where the environmental mode v̂ is associated with a vacuum
state. Thermal noise can be neglected from an information-
theoretical point of view, because an upper bound on a
pure-loss channel would automatically be an upper bound on
a thermal-loss channel. In fact, a thermal-loss channel E n̄eηd
as in Eq. (B1) is equivalent to a composition of a pure-loss
channel Eηd followed by an additive-noise Gaussian channel
Aξηd : â → â +
√
1 − ηdξ , where the variable ξ is taken with







1 − ηd(v̂ + ξ )
= √ηdâ +
√
1 − ηdê. (B2)
Because we have E n̄eηd = Aξηd ◦ Eηd , we may apply data pro-
cessing for any functional that is decreasing under completely
positive trace-preserving (CPTP) maps. This is a property
which can be exploited for the REE.
Given two states ρ and σ , their relative entropy is defined
by S(ρ||σ ) := Tr[ρ(log2 ρ − log2 σ )]. Then, the REE of a




where SEP is the set of separable states. Now we observe
that the relative entropy is monotonic under the same CPTP
map N applied to both its arguments, i.e., S[N (ρ)||N (σ )] 
S(ρ||σ ). This allows one to show that, for any bipartite state
ρAB, we may also write
ER[I ⊗ N (ρAB)]  ER(ρAB). (B4)
In fact, it is quite easy to check that
ER[I ⊗ N (ρAB)] = inf
σ∈SEP










where (1) exploits the fact that I ⊗ N (σAB) represent a subset
of all possible separable states, and (2) exploits the mono-
tonicity of the relative entropy under the CPTP map I ⊗ N .
The ultimate rates at which two remote parties can gener-
ate a key (secret key capacity K), or distribute entanglement
(two-way assisted entanglement distribution capacity E , also
denoted by D2), or teleport/transfer quantum states (two-way
assisted quantum capacity Q2) at the two ends of a bosonic
single-mode Gaussian channel G are all limited by the follow-
ing REE bound [17]:













AB is a TMSV state with variance μ, i.e., (μ − 1)/2
mean number of photons in each mode.
For any composition of Gaussian channels, we can com-
bine Eq. (B6) with the data processing inequality in Eq. (B4).
In particular, for the secret key capacity of a thermal-loss











(Eηd ) = (ηd) := − log2(1 − ηd) (B8)
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is the PLOB bound [17]. For ηd ≃ 0, we have the approxima-
tion
(ηd) ≃ ηd/ ln 2 = 1.44ηd (bits per channel use). (B9)
Consider now free-space line-of-sight quantum communi-
cation at wavelength λ, between a transmitter, generating a
Gaussian beam with spot size w0 and curvature radius R0, and
a remote receiver, with aperture radius aR at slant distance
z. The corresponding expression for the diffraction-induced
transmissivity ηd is explicitly given in Eq. (A18). By replacing
it in the PLOB bound (ηd), we see that the maximum rate
for QKD and, therefore, any other form of quantum commu-
nication, is bounded by







where wz is the spot-size function of Eq. (A9). More explic-
itly, we may write















From Eq. (B11), we see that the bound is maximized by a


















where f0R is the Fresnel number product associated to the
beam and the receiver, as in Eq. (A21). Instead, for a colli-












≃ Ufoc(z), in the far field. (B14)
APPENDIX C: ATMOSPHERIC TURBULENCE
A crucial parameter in the study of atmospheric turbulence
is the refraction index structure constant C2n [10,11]. This
measures the strength of the fluctuations in the refraction
index, due to spatial variations of temperature and pressure.
There are several models which provide C2n with a functional
expression in terms of the altitude h in meters above sea level.
The most known is the H-V model [27,28],






× 10−16e−h/1500 + Ae−h/100, (C1)
where v is the wind speed (m/s) and A ≃ C2n (0). Assum-
ing high-altitude low-wind v = 21 m/s and the ground-level
nighttime value A = 1.7 × 10−14 m−2/3, one has the H-V5/7
model [10, Sec. 12.2.1]. However, during the day, we may
have A ≃ 2.75 × 10−14 m−2/3 [20]. In our paper, we assume
v = 21 m/s, the day value A ≃ 2.75 × 10−14 m−2/3, and an
altitude of h = 30 m, so C2n ≃ 2.06 × 10−14 m−2/3.
The structure constant is at the basis of other important
parameters such as the scintillation index [10] and the Rytov
variance [66], which is given by
σ 2Rytov = 1.23C2n k7/6z11/6. (C2)
The condition σ 2Rytov < 1 corresponds to the regime of weak
turbulence, where scintillation (i.e., random fluctuations of
the intensity) can be considered to be negligible, and the
mean intensity of the beam can still be approximated by a
Gaussian spatial profile. An alternative condition was con-
sidered by Yura [29] and Fante [25] in terms of the
spherical-wave coherence length ρ0, which is closely related
to the Fried’s parameter [67,68]. For a fixed (or mean) value






Then, weak turbulence corresponds to the condition
z  k[min{2aR, ρ0}]2. (C4)
We note that, in our numerical investigations, Eq. (C2) turns
out to be more stringent than the condition in Eq. (C4). In fact,
for the regime of daytime parameters considered in Fig. 2 of
the main text, σ 2Rytov < 1 leads to z  1066 m, while Eq. (C4)
implies z  1657 m.
In the regime of weak turbulence, we may distinguish the
actions of small and large turbulent eddies: Those smaller
than the beam waist act on a fast timescale and broaden the
waist; those larger than the beam waist act on a slow timescale
(10 − 100 ms) and randomly deflect the beam [25]. The over-
all action can be decomposed in the sum of two contributions,
the broadening of the diffraction-limited beam waist wz into
the short-term spot size wst, and the random wandering of
the beam centroid with variance σ 2TB. Averaging over all the
dynamics, one has the long-term spot size [25, Eq. (32)]:
w
2
lt = w2st + σ 2TB. (C5)






then we can write decomposition in Eq. (C5) where the long-

















(1 − φ)2, (C8)
and we may also expand





As a result, for the variance of centroid wandering, we derive
the following expression [29]:








Note that, while the expression in Eq. (C7) of the long-term
spot size w2lt is valid under general conditions [25, Eq. (37)],
Yura’s short-term expressions in Eqs. (C8) and (C10) are
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rigorous in the limit φ ≪ 1. These short-term expressions can
also be considered good approximations for ρ0/w0 < 1, i.e.,
for φ < 0.33. In the regime of daytime parameters considered
for Fig. 2 of the main text, we have that φ < 0.33 implies a
minimum distance z  200 m. (In other words, our numerical
investigation in that figure meets the sweet spot provided
by the range 200  z  1066, where turbulence is weak and
Yura’s analytical expansions are approximately correct.)
When φ passes its threshold (i.e., ρ0/w0  1), the ex-
pansions in Eqs. (C8) and (C10) become imprecise and the
correct value of w2st needs to be numerically derived from the
1/e point of the spherical-wave short-term mutual coherence
function (see Ref. [29]). Alternatively, one can exploit Eqs.
41(a), (41b), and Fig. 3 of Ref. [25]. Once w2st is known,
then Eq. (C5) can be used to derive σ 2TB. When ρ0/w0 ≫ 1,
σ 2TB is negligible and w
2
st is equal to the long-term value w
2
lt
in Eq. (C7). The long-term spot-size w2lt also applies in the
regime of strong turbulence z ≫ k[min{2aR, ρ0}]2, where the
beam is broken up into multiple patches; in this case, w2lt
describes the radius of the mean region where the multiple
patches are observed.
Remark 1. The expressions in Eqs. (C7) and (C8)
are derived from Ref. [29, Eqs. (16)–(18)] and Ref. [25,
Eq. (37)], changing their notation from intensity spot size
(wI) to field spot size (w =
√
2wI). In Ref. [25], instead of








Despite being slightly different, its expansion for ρ0/w0 ≪ 1
is the same as in Eq. (C9). As a result, the centroid wandering
is characterized by the same variance σ 2TB as in Eq. (C10),
which is equivalent to Eq. (40) of Ref. [25]. Also note that
Yura’s expressions take different forms in terms of the Fried’s














APPENDIX D: RANDOM WALK OF THE BEAM
CENTROID
Consider a random walk of the beam centroid xC around
an average point xP at distance d from the center of the
receiver xR, following a Gaussian distribution with variance
σ 2. The distribution for the instantaneous deflection distance
r = ‖xC − xR‖  0 will be Rician with parameters d and σ ,
i.e.,














When the mean deflection is zero (d = 0), Eq. (D1) can be
simplified to the Weibull distribution PWB(r) := p(r|0, σ ) of
Eq. (24) of the main text.
By combining the Rice distribution of the centroid r given









which is the inverse of Eq. (23) of the main text, one can
easily compute the probability distribution for the deflected
transmissivity:





Explicitly, this takes the following form:



















for 0 < τ  η (D4)
and zero otherwise.
The latter equation can also be derived by combining Ref.
[31, Eq. (8)], there written for the transmittance coefficient√
τ , with the probability density of the squared variable
P(τ ) = (2√τ )−1P(√τ ). Also note that the distribution in
Eq. (D4) can be bounded exploiting the inequality I0(x) 
cosh(x)  exp(x) valid for any x  0. For x = 0, the equality
holds, while for x > 0 the upper bound comes from the fact
that we may write In(x) <
xn
2nn!
cosh(x) for n = 0, 1, ... which
can be easily proven starting from Ref. [74, Eq. (6.25)]. After























Assuming zero mean deflection (d = 0), Eq. (D4) simpli-
fies to P0(τ ) in Eq. (25) of the main text. The probability
distribution P0(τ ) describes the statistics of the fading channel
by providing the instantaneous value of the deflected transmis-
sivity τ for the case where the average position of the beam
centroid is aligned with the center of the receiver’s aperture.
APPENDIX E: ACHIEVABILITY OF THE LOSS-BASED
BOUNDS
As long as the instantaneous (short-term) quantum chan-
nels can be approximated to pure-loss channels Eτ , the upper
bound in Eq. (27) of the main text is an achievable rate for
secret key generation and entanglement distribution. In fact,
the PLOB upper bound (τ ) = − log2(1 − τ ) of each Eτ
is achievable, i.e., there are optimal protocols whose rates
saturate this ultimate limit for all the relevant capacities, so we
have Q2(Eτ ) = D2(Eτ ) = K (Eτ ) = (τ ). In fact, a pure-loss
channel is known to be distillable [17], which means that
the upper bound (τ ), based on the REE, is achievable by a
protocol of entanglement distribution, so that D2(Eτ ) = (τ ).
In particular, it is sufficient to consider a protocol where the
entanglement is distributed and then distilled with the help
of a single round of feedback classical communication [37].
This protocol may achieve a rate that is at least the reverse
coherent information of the channel IRCI(Eτ ) = − log2(1 − τ )
[36]. Once this entanglement has been distilled, it can also be
used to transmit qubits via teleportation or to generate secret
keys.
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If we are interested in QKD only, then there are different
asymptotic ways to reach the PLOB upper bound, i.e., the se-
cret key capacity K of the pure-loss channel. This is certainly
possible by using a QKD protocol equipped with a quantum
memory as discussed in Ref. [17]. An alternative method is
to use a strongly biased QKD protocol with squeezed states
[75]. Suppose that, with probability p, the transmitter pre-
pares a position-squeezed state with CM diag(μ−1, μ). With
probability 1 − p, it instead prepares a momentum-squeezed
state with CM diag(μ,μ−1). In each case, the mean value of
the squeezed quadrature is Gaussianly modulated with vari-
ance μ − μ−1, so that the average output state is an isotropic
thermal state with variance μ = 2n̄T + 1, where n̄T is the
mean number of photons. These states are sent through the
link and measured at the receiver by a homodyne detector
switching between position and momentum with the same
probability distribution of the transmitter. Finally, the parties
perform a sifting process where they only select their match-
ing choices of the quadrature, which happens with frequency
p2 + (1 − p)2.
Assume that the communication is long enough (asymp-
totic limit of infinite signals exchanged) so that the parties
access many times the instantaneous pure-loss channel Eτ
for some τ (within some small resolution δτ ). For large μ,
we can compute the following mutual information between
transmitter and receiver:
IT R|p,τ ≃







Assuming reverse reconciliation, where the variable to be
inferred is the outcome of the receiver, we have that the
eavesdropper’s information cannot exceed the Holevo bound
χER|τ ≃ 12 log2[(1 − τ )τμ]. (E2)
The asymptotic (conditional) rate is equal to
Rsq(p, τ ) := IT R|p,τ − χER|τ . (E3)
For an unbiased protocol (p = 1/2), we have Rsq(1/2, τ ) =
(τ )/2. In the limit of a completely biased protocol (p → 1),
we instead find Rsq(1
−, τ ) → (τ ).
It is clear that this is the same performance that could be
achieved by an equivalent entanglement-based protocol where
the transmitter sends the B-modes of TMSV states (with large
variance μ), keeps their A modes in a quantum memory, and
finally homodynes the A modes once the receiver classically
communicates which detection was in the position quadrature
and which was in the momentum one [17,36].
Let us now account for the fading process, according
to which the instantaneous transmissivity τ occurs with
probability density P0(τ ). In a coarse-graining descrip-
tion of the process, one has a large number of instan-
taneous channels with transmissivities contained in slots
[0, δτ ], [δτ, 2δτ ], . . . [(k − 1)δτ, kδτ ], . . . up to a maximum
value η, given by ηstηeffηatm. Each slot is used a large (virtually
infinite) number of times. Therefore, we can take a suitable
joint limit for small δτ , and approximate the weighted sum
of rates with an integral. For the case of the squeezed-state




dτ P0(τ )Rsq(p, τ ). (E4)
In the biased limit p → 1−, we have that the achievable rate





dτ P0(τ )(τ ), (E5)
which coincides with the upper bound of Eq. (27) of the main
text. In other words, this bound is asymptotically achievable
by this ideal QKD protocol.
It is clear that the squeezed-state protocol just represents a
theoretical tool to demonstrate the achievability of the bound
but it is not realizable with current technology. Consider now
the protocol of Ref. [14], where the transmitter Gaussianly
modulates coherent states and the receiver performs homo-
dyne detection switching between the two quadratures. In the
large modulation limit, one computes the instantaneous rate






dτ P0(τ )(τ ), (E6)
achieving half of the bound.
APPENDIX F: FREE-SPACE BOUNDS
WITH THERMAL NOISE
1. Thermal-noise model
During daytime operation, background thermal noise may
become nontrivial. For this reason, we need to suitably modify
the description of the free-space channel and derive more
appropriate bounds. In the presence of non-negligible noise,
an instantaneous (short-term) quantum channel can be ap-
proximated by an overall thermal-loss channel Eτ,n̄ between
transmitter and receiver. More precisely, assume that n̄T is
the mean number of photons in the mode generated by the
transmitter. Then, the mean number of photons n̄R reaching
the receiver’s detector is given by the input-output relation
n̄T → n̄R = τ n̄T + n̄, (F1)
where τ is the instantaneous transmissivity, and n̄ = ηeffn̄B +
n̄ex is the channel’s thermal number, given by the detected
environmental photons ηeffn̄B plus extra photons n̄ex added by
the receiver’s setup. To understand Eq. (F1), see also Fig. 1 of
the main text.
The instantaneous channel Eτ,n̄ can equivalently be de-
scribed by a beam splitter with transmissivity τ mixing an
input mode with an environmental mode with mean number
of photons n̄e = n̄/(1 − τ ). Channel’s transmissivity τ varies
between 0 and a maximum value η according to the probabil-
ity density P0(τ ) determined by turbulence and pointing error.
The mean number of thermal photons n̄ can be assumed to be
constant by assuming a suitably stabilized receiver setup (with
negligible fluctuations in n̄ex) and stable conditions for the
external background (so that the photons collected within the
field of view are approximately constant). If this assumption is
not met, then we can always make n̄ constant by maximizing
it over τ (worst-case scenario, suitable for the lower bound)
or minimizing it over τ (best-case scenario, suitable for the
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upper bound). For this reason, we can always model the free-
space fading channel E as an ensemble {P0(τ ), Eτ,n̄}, whose
elements have variable τ but constant n̄.
2. Upper and lower bounds
Given the asymptotic rate R(Eτ,n̄) associated with a generic
instantaneous channel Eτ,n̄, the asymptotic rate of the free-




dτ P0(τ )R(Eτ,n̄). (F2)
This rate is asymptotically achievable if the fading dynamics
is perfectly resolved by detectors and a large (virtually in-
finite) number of signals are allocated to each infinitesimal
slot [τ, τ + dτ ]. It also assumes that the adaptive optics com-
pletely eliminates any average offset d of the beam’s centroid
[otherwise P0 is replaced by the more general distribution in
Eq. (D4)].
Because the instantaneous channel is a thermal-loss chan-
nel Eτ,n̄, we do not know its two-way assisted capacities
D2(Eτ,n̄) = Q2(Eτ,n̄)  K (Eτ,n̄) and we are limited to consider
upper and lower bounds. The secret key capacity is upper-
bounded by the thermal-loss version of the PLOB bound
K (Eτ,n̄)  (τ, n̄), given by
(τ, n̄) = − log2
[







for n̄  τ , while (τ, n̄) = 0 for n̄  τ . In the previous for-
mula, the entropic quantity h is defined as in Eq. (35), i.e., we
have
h(x) := (x + 1) log2(x + 1) − x log2 x. (F4)
As a result, any key rate associated with the fading channel




dτ P0(τ )(τ, n̄), (F5)
which is different from zero when n̄  η = ηstηeffηatm.
Let us define the normalization factor
N (n̄, η, σ ) :=
∫ η
n̄
dτ P0(τ ), (F6)














and the following entropic quantity:
g(n̄) := n̄ log2 n̄
1 − n̄ + h(n̄), (F8)
= (n̄ + 1) log2(n̄ + 1) +
n̄2 log2 n̄
1 − n̄ . (F9)






log2(1 − τ ) +
n̄













1 − n̄ + h(n̄)
] ∫ η
n̄
dτ P0(τ ) (F11)
 B(η, σ ) − T (n̄, η, σ ), (F12)
where B(η, σ ) = −(η, σ ) log2(1 − η) is the pure-loss upper
bound [cf. Eqs. (27) and (28) of the main text], and T (n̄, η, σ )
is a thermal correction given by
T (n̄, η, σ ) = g(n̄)N (n̄, η, σ ) − (n̄, σ ) log2(1 − n̄). (F13)
Let us now discuss lower bounds. For each short-term in-
stantaneous channel, an asymptotically achievable rate R(Eτ,n̄)
is given by the reverse coherent information [36], here taking
the following form:





Replacing this expression in Eq. (F2) provides an achievable
rate for entanglement distribution and secret key generation
via the free-space link. Explicitly, we write














If we look at QKD, we can consider two specific pro-
tocols. For an asymptotically biased squeezed-state protocol
(p → 1−), we can write the short-term rate Rsq(1−, τ, n̄) →
IRCI(Eτ,n̄). For the coherent-state protocol, we can instead
write













Replacing these expressions in Eq. (F2) provides asymp-
totically achievable QKD rates for the free-space link. In



















In conclusion, according to our derivations, the optimal
rates for entanglement distribution and key generation in the
presence of background thermal noise can be bounded by the
following sandwich relation:





 R  B(η, σ ) − T (n̄, η, σ ). (F20)
One can check that these inequalities collapse to single loss-
based bound R ≃ B(η, σ ) for small thermal numbers n̄ (e.g.,
compatible with night-time operation).
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APPENDIX G: MORE DETAILS ON THE COMPOSABLE
SECURITY OF CV-QKD
1. Composable key rate under collective attacks
Consider a CV-QKD protocol where N modes are trans-
mitted from Alice A (transmitter) to Bob B (receiver). A
portion n of these modes will be used for key generation,
while the remaining part is used for parameter estimation
(and other potential operations). Here we start by assuming
perfect knowledge of the channel parameters; afterward, we
will include the effect of imperfect knowledge as coming from
parameter estimation.
Let us call x Alice’s variable and y Bob’s variable. In the
homodyne protocol, the relevant quadrature is selected by
Bob’s randomly switched measurement of q̂ and p̂. There-
fore, x and y represent Alice’s quadrature encoding and the
corresponding Bob’s outcome after the random selection im-
posed by the measurement. In the heterodyne protocol, these
variables are instead bidimensional real vectors associated to
both quadratures, so we have x = (qA, pA) and y = (qB, pB).
The CVs are subject to analog-to-digital conversion (ADC),
described by x
ADC→ k and y ADC→ l , where k and l are d-bit
strings. Note that, for the heterodyne protocol, ADC may
occur independently for each quadrature (qA, pA)
ADC→ (lq, lp)
after which one may concatenate l = lqlp. In such a case, we
assume that each quadrature component is digitalized with
d/2 bits (for even d).
Under the action of a collective attack, the output CQ state





p(k, l )|k〉A〈k| ⊗ |l〉B〈l| ⊗ ρE (k, l ), (G1)
and p(k, l ) is a joint probability distribution. For n uses, there
will be two sequences, kn and ln, with binary length n log2 d
and associated probability p(kn, ln). Alice and Bob will then
perform procedures of error correction and privacy amplifica-





|z〉An〈z| ⊗ |z〉Bn〈z| ⊗ ρEn , (G2)
where Alice’s and Bob’s classical systems contain the same
random sequence z of binary length sn from which Eve is
completely decoupled.
In reverse reconciliation, it is Alice attempting to recon-
struct Bob’s sequence ln. During the step of error correction,
Bob reveals leakec bits of information to help Alice to com-
pute her guess l̃n of ln starting from her local data kn. In a
practical scheme, these leakec bits of information correspond
to a syndrome that Bob computes over his sequence ln, in-
terpreted as noisy codeword of a linear error-correcting code
agreed with Alice.
Then, as a verification, Alice and Bob publicly compare
hashes computed over ln and l̃n. If these hashes coincide,
the two parties go ahead with probability pec, otherwise they
abort the protocol. The hash comparison requires Bob sending
⌈− log2 εcor⌉ bits to Alice for some suitable εcor (the number
of these bits is negligible in comparison to leakec). Parameter
εcor is called ε correctness [76, Sec. 4.3] and it bounds the
probability that the sequences are different even if their hashes
coincide. The probability of such an error is bounded by [77]
pecProb(l̃
n = ln)  pec2−⌈− log2 εcor⌉  εcor. (G3)
Note that pec and εcor are implicitly related. In fact, the lower
is the value of εcor, the stronger is the hash-verification test
made over the sequences ln and l̃n, which results in a lower
probability of success pec.
Error correction can be simulated by a projection S of
Alice’s and Bob’s classical systems An and Bn onto a good set
S of sequences. With success probability
pec = Tr(Sρ⊗n), (G4)
this operation generates a CQ state
ρ̃n := p−1ec Sρ⊗nS , (G5)
which is restricted to those good sequences {kn, ln} that
can be transformed into a successful pair {l̃n, ln} by Alice’s
transformation kn → l̃n. We implicitly assume that the latter
transformation is performed on the state ρ̃n so that it provides
the pair {l̃n, ln} for next manipulations.
With probability pec the protocol proceeds to privacy am-
plification, where the parties apply a two-way hash function
over ρ̃n which outputs the privacy amplified state ρ̄n, i.e.,
ρ⊗n
ec−→ ρ̃n pa−→ ρ̄n. The latter state approximates the ideal
private state ρid, so we may write pecD(ρ̄
n, ρid)  εsec where
εsec is the ε secrecy of the protocol [76, Sec. 4.3]. Via the
triangle inequality, this condition implies [76, Th. 4.1]
pecD(ρ̃
n, ρid)  ε := εcor + εsec, (G6)
and the protocol is said to be ε secure.
Thanks to the procedure of two-universal hashing applied
to ρ̃n, Alice and Bob’s state ρ̄n will contain sn bits of shared
uniform randomness. According to Ref. [78] (see also Ref.





n|En)ρ̃n + 2 log2
√
2εh − leakec. (G7)
Here H εsmin(l
n|En)ρ̃n is the smooth min-entropy of Bob’s se-
quence ln conditioned on Eve’s system En, and the smoothing
εs and hashing εh parameters satisfy
εs + εh = εsec. (G8)
In Eq. (G7), we explicitly account for the bits leaked to




n|EnR)ρ̃n + 2 log2
√
2εh where R is a register of di-
mension dR = 2leakec , while En are the systems used by
Eve during the quantum communication. Then, the chain





n|En)ρ̃n − log2 dR.
As a next step, we revise and improve a previous result
which connects the smooth-min entropies of ρ̃n and ρ⊗n. In
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Because H εsmin only depends on Bob and Eve’s parts of the
state ρ̃n, one could trace Alice’s system ρ̃n →trAρ̃n and write
the bound above directly for the reduced state. See Ap-
pendix G 2 for a proof of Eq. (G9) which exploits tools from
Refs. [79,80].
Next, we simplify the smooth-min entropy term via the














where H (l|E )ρ is the conditional von Neumann entropy com-
puted over the single-copy state ρ, and [79, Th. 6.4]



















with d being the cardinality of the discretized variable l .
The combination of Eqs. (G7), (G9), and (G10) allows us
to write the following lower bound:














2εh − leakec. (G12)
Note that, for the conditional entropy, we have
H (l|E )ρ = H (l ) − χ (l : E )ρ, (G13)
where H (l ) is the Shannon entropy of l , and χ (l : E )ρ is
Eve’s Holevo bound with respect to l . Because of the data
processing inequality, we have χ (l : E )ρ  χ (y : E )ρ under
digitalization y
ADC→ l , and we may write
H (l|E )ρ  H (l ) − χ (y : E )ρ . (G14)
Moreover, we may define the reconciliation parameter β ∈
[0, 1] by setting
H (l ) − n−1leakec = βI (x : y), (G15)
where I (x : y)  I (k : l ) is Alice and Bob’s mutual informa-
tion computed over their CVs. By replacing Eqs. (G14) and
(G15) in Eq. (G12), we derive



















where we have introduced the asymptotic rate:
R∞ = βI (x : y) − χ (y : E )ρ . (G17)
The lower bound in Eq. (G16) refers to a protocol with secu-
rity ε = εcor + εs + εh and success probability pec.
Let us account for the effect of parameter estimation. The
asymptotic key rate R∞ depends on a number npm of parame-
ters p (e.g., transmissivity and thermal noise of the channel).
By sacrificing m modes, Alice and Bob compute maximum
likelihood estimators p̂ with associated mean values p̄ and
error variances σ 2p . Then, they compute worst-case estimators
pwc which are w standard deviations away from the mean
values of the estimators or they are computed by employing
suitable tail bounds for the variables involved. Each worst-
case estimator bounds the corresponding actual parameter up
to an error probability εpe = εpe(w), so all together the npm
worst-case estimators pwc bound the parameters p up to a
total error probability ≃ npmεpe. Correspondingly, the key rate
R∞(p) is replaced by Rpe := R∞(pwc).
Note that assuming pwc for the quantum channel is equiv-
alent to change the global output ρ̃n of Alice, Bob and Eve
with a worst-case state ρ̃nwc (described by parameters that
are at least as good as the worst-case estimators). However,
with probability npmεpe, one could have a different state ρ̃
n
bad
with a lower rate (where one or more parameters violate
the worst-case estimators). On average, the state could be
modelled as ρpe := (1 − npmεpe)ρ̃nwc + npmεpeρ̃nbad with trace
distance D(ρpe, ρ̃
n
wc)  npmεpe. From D(ρ̃
n
wc, ρid)  ε/pec [cf.
Eq. (G6)] and the triangle inequality, we compute
D(ρpe, ρid)  ε/pec + npmεpe. (G18)
Thus, the average state ρpe is (ε/pec + npmεpe) close to an
ideal private state ρid whose number of secret bits sn is
lower-bounded by Eq. (G16) up to replacing R∞ → Rpe. It is
clear that parameter estimation adds an overall error pecnpmεpe
to the ε security of the protocol so that we have ε → ε +
pecnpmεpe, as is clear from Eq. (G18).
Replacing R∞ → Rpe in Eq. (G16), dividing by N = n + m
and including pec, we derive the following bound for the com-
posable secret key rate (bits per use) of a generic CV-QKD





























which is valid for a protocol with success probability pec (or
frame error rate 1 − pec) and overall security:
ε = εcor + εs + εh + pecnpmεpe. (G20)
The expression in Eq. (G19) corresponds to Eq. (105) in the
main text.
2. Proof of Eq. (G9)
Consider an arbitrary Hilbert space H and two gener-
ally subnormalized states ρ, ρ∗ ∈ S(H) with Trρ, Trρ∗ 
1. We may consider the purified distance [81] P(ρ, ρ∗) =√
1 − FG(ρ, ρ∗)2, where FG is the generalized quantum fi-
delity [79, Def. 3.3, Lemma 3.1]
FG(ρ, ρ∗) := F (ρ, ρ∗) +
√
(1 − Trρ)(1 − Trρ∗), (G21)





Using the Fuchs-van de Graaf inequalities [82], one may
check that DG  P 
√
2DG − D2G 
√
2DG, where DG is the
generalized trace distance [79, Def. 3.1]
DG(ρ, ρ∗) := D(ρ, ρ∗) + 12 |Trρ − Trρ∗|, (G23)
D(ρ, ρ∗) := 12 ||ρ − ρ∗||1 = 12 Tr|ρ − ρ∗|. (G24)
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P∗(x)|x〉C〈x| ⊗ ω∗(x), (G26)
where the classical system C is equivalent to an alphabet ℵ
of dimension d , and the quantum system Q has dimension
dQ  d . Here P(x) and P∗(x) are probability distributions,
while ω(x) and ω∗(x) are generally subnormalized states de-
fined over system Q. In the following, we assume that the state
ρ is normalized to 1, also denoted by ρ ∈ S=(H).
For any normalized state ρ of two quantum systems A and
B, we may write [79, Def. 5.2]




Bε(ρ) := {ρ ′ : Trρ ′  1, P(ρ ′, ρ)  ε < 1} (G28)
is a ball of generally subnormalized states around ρ. In partic-
ular, for any normalized CQ state ρ, we can find a (generally
subnormalized) CQ state ρ∗ ∈ Bε(ρ) such that [79, Prop. 5.8]
H εmin(C|Q)ρ = Hmin(C|Q)ρ∗ . (G29)
Consider a projector  := ∑x∈ |x〉C〈x| defined over a
reduced alphabet  ⊆ ℵ for the classical system C. Also
consider two CQ states, ρ ∈ S=(HCQ) and ρ∗ ∈ S(HCQ), the
latter with normalization
N := Trρ∗ =
∑
x∈ℵ
P∗(x)Tr[ω∗(x)]  1. (G30)
We may write the two projected states
σ = p−1ρ = p−1
∑
x∈
P(x)|x〉C〈x| ⊗ ω(x), (G31)
σ∗ = p−1∗ ρ∗ = p−1∗
∑
x∈
P∗(x)|x〉C〈x| ⊗ ω∗(x), (G32)
with associated probabilities








For ρ∗, σ∗ ∈ S(HCQ), we may then write
Hmin(C|Q)σ∗  Hmin(C|Q)ρ∗ + log2 p∗. (G35)
To prove Eq. (G35), we adopt the approach of Ref. [80,
Lemma 1] (for normalized states) but starting from a dif-
ferent result that is valid for subnormalized states. For any
σ∗ ∈ S(HCQ), we may write [79, Eq. (4.6)]
2−Hmin(C|Q)σ∗ = max
EQ→Q′
〈ŴCQ′ |I ⊗ E (σ∗)|ŴCQ′〉, (G36)






is a non-normalized entangled state defined over the orthonor-
mal set of states {|x〉}. The latter is a basis for C and a set for
Q′, which is assumed to have dQ′  d . It is easy to see that









= p−1∗ 〈Ŵ|I ⊗ E (ρ∗)|Ŵ〉. (G38)
This leads to
2−Hmin(C|Q)σ∗  p−1∗ max
EQ→Q′
〈ŴCQ′ |I ⊗ E (ρ∗)|ŴCQ′〉
= p−1∗ 2−Hmin(C|Q)ρ∗ . (G39)
Taking the log, we obtain Eq. (G35).
For the projected states, σ and σ∗, and their probabilities,
p and p∗, we may write the following inequalities (proven
below):





In fact, consider the normalized state ρ∗N := N−1ρ∗ with
p∗ = Tr(ρ∗N ). Recall that the trace distance between two
normalized states ρ and ρ∗N is equal to the maximum
Kolmogorov distance between the probability distributions
generated by the application of a POVM. Considering the
(generally nonoptimal) POVM {k} = {, I − }, we may
write
‖ρ − ρ∗N‖1 
∑
k
|Tr(kρ) − Tr(kρ∗N )| = 2|p − p∗|.
(G42)
Using the result above and the triangle inequality, we get
|p − p∗|  D(ρ, ρ∗N )  D(ρ, ρ∗) + D(ρ∗, ρ∗N ). (G43)
It is easy to check that














|p − p∗|  D(ρ, ρ∗) +
1 − Trρ∗
2
= DG(ρ, ρ∗). (G45)
To prove Eq. (G41), we suitably extend the approach of
Ref. [80, Lemma 2] to include subnormalized states. First,
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where we have used the triangle inequality for the trace dis-
tance (here applied to Hermitian operators). It is easy to show








= p−1D(ρ, ρ∗). (G51)











Tr|(p−1 − p−1∗ )P∗(x)ω∗(x)| (G53)
= 1
2






















From the inequality above and the fact that Trσ∗ = Trρ∗, we
















which leads to Eq. (G41).
We now have all the ingredients to conclude the proof.
Given a normalized CQ state ρ, take a generally subnormal-
ized CQ state ρ∗ ∈ Bε(ρ) which realizes Eq. (G29), i.e.,
Hmin(C|Q)ρ∗ = H εmin(C|Q)ρ . (G59)
For the projected states σ and σ∗, we may replace
DG(ρ∗, ρ)  P(ρ∗, ρ)  ε in Eqs. (G40) and (G41), and write





From Eq. (G61), we see that P(σ, σ∗) 
√
3ε/p := ε′, so
that σ∗ ∈ Bε′ (σ ). Assume that p > 0 and ε < p/3 so that ε′ <
1 and the ε′ ball is well defined (this is typically the case be-




min(C|Q)σ  Hmin(C|Q)σ∗ . (G62)




min(C|Q)σ  Hmin(C|Q)ρ∗ + log2 p∗. (G63)
Now using Eqs. (G59) and (G60), we get
H ε
′
min(C|Q)σ  H εmin(C|Q)ρ + log2(p − ε). (G64)
Finally, by replacing ε → pε2/3 so that ε′ → ε, we write
H εmin(C|Q)σ  H pε
2/3
min (C|Q)ρ + log2[p(1 − ε2/3)]. (G65)
The latter inequality provides Eq. (G9) up to performing the
correct replacements (σ → ρ̃n, ρ → ρ⊗n, C → ln, Q → En,
etc.)
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